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Abstract:​ ​​This​ ​paper​ ​seeks​ ​to ​ ​intervene​ ​in​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​discourses​ ​of​ ​self-determination​ ​as 
well​ ​as​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​discourses​ ​concerning​ ​care.​ ​Attending​ ​to​ ​the​ ​material,​ ​gendered,​ ​and 
racialized ​ ​individual ​ ​care​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​living,​ ​cooking,​ ​cleaning,​ ​working,​ ​and ​ ​raising​ ​children​ ​is 
an ​ ​affirmative​ ​step​ ​towards​ ​alleviating​ ​the​ ​difficulties ​ ​in​ ​navigating​ ​mental​ ​distress​ ​and 
treatment​ ​for​ ​white​ ​women​ ​and,​ ​especially,​ ​women​ ​of​ ​color​ ​in​ ​the​ ​global​ ​north. 
Keywords:​​ ​care,​ ​self-determination,​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability,​ ​disability​ ​studies 
Care​ ​as​ ​it ​ ​is​ ​currently​ ​framed​ ​in​ ​the​ ​global​ ​north​ ​is​ ​a​ ​widely​ ​contested​ ​term,​ ​with 
varying​ ​connotations​ ​including​ ​burden,​ ​dependency​ ​and​ ​need,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​reciprocity, 
emotional​ ​fulfillment,​ ​and​ ​necessity​ ​(as​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​life​ ​course).​ ​Everyone,​ ​at​ ​some​ ​point​ ​in 
their​ ​lives,​ ​will ​ ​require​ ​care.​ ​Disability​ ​studies​ ​scholarship​ ​around​ ​care​ ​investigates​ ​and 
critiques​ ​these ​ ​central ​ ​issues​ ​including​ ​dependency,​ ​disabled​ ​persons​ ​as​ ​care​ ​burden,​ ​and 
exploitation​ ​and​ ​abuse.​ ​One​ ​line​ ​of​ ​this​ ​scholarship​ ​offers​ ​new ​ ​conceptualizations​ ​of​ ​care​ ​such 
as​ ​interdependence,​ ​and​ ​reframes​ ​dependency​ ​to​ ​include​ ​the​ ​moral,​ ​ethical​ ​and​ ​affective 
aspects​ ​of​ ​caregiving​ ​and​ ​receiving​ ​(Kelly,​ ​2013,​ ​2016;​ ​Kittay,​ ​2011;​ ​Shakespeare,​ ​2000). 
Disability​ ​studies​ ​scholars​ ​have​ ​also​ ​addressed​ ​the​ ​oppressive​ ​material​ ​conditions​ ​of 
transnational ​ ​capitalism​ ​that ​ ​impact ​ ​caring​ ​relationships​ ​(Erevelles,​ ​2011c).​ ​While​ ​physical 
disabilities​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​more​ ​profound​ ​and​ ​cognitive​ ​disabilities ​ ​are​ ​entering​ ​the​ ​conversation 
within​ ​disability​ ​studies,​ ​the​ ​unique​ ​issues ​ ​surrounding​ ​care​ ​for​ ​people​ ​with​ ​psychiatric 
disabilities​ ​are​ ​just​ ​recently​ ​emerging. ​ ​This​ ​paper​ ​seeks​ ​to ​ ​intervene​ ​and ​ ​move​ ​the 
conversation​ ​forward​ ​about ​ ​care​ ​and ​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability​ ​in ​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​theories​ ​of 
caring ​ ​and ​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​self-determination.​ ​The​ ​paper​ ​especially​ ​complicates​ ​that 
idea ​ ​that​ ​fostering​ ​self-determination​ ​is​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​path​ ​to​ ​recovery​ ​from​ ​psychiatric 
disability. 
Feminist​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​scholar​ ​Margaret​ ​Price​ ​(2015)​ ​contends​ ​that​ ​care​ ​for​ ​crip 
“body/minds”​ ​“must​ ​emerge​ ​between​ ​subjects​ ​considered​ ​to​ ​be​ ​equally ​ ​valuable​ ​(which​ ​does 
not​ ​necessarily​ ​mean​ ​that​ ​both​ ​are​ ​operating​ ​from​ ​similar​ ​places ​ ​of​ ​rationality),​ ​and​ ​it​ ​must​ ​be 
participatory​ ​in​ ​nature,​ ​that​ ​is,​ ​developed​ ​through​ ​the​ ​desires​ ​and​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​all​ ​participants”​ ​(p. 
279).​ ​I​ ​seek ​ ​to​ ​build​ ​on​ ​this​ ​notion,​ ​suggesting​ ​that​ ​basic​ ​care​ ​needs​ ​are​ ​often​ ​neglected​ ​in 
mental​ ​health​ ​and​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​literature​ ​concerning​ ​care.​ ​Mental​ ​health​ ​professionals 
advocate ​ ​for​ ​self-determination,​ ​person-centered​ ​planning ​ ​and​ ​peer​ ​support​ ​as​ ​crucial 
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2012;​ ​Davidson,​ ​2016;​ ​Mancini,​ ​2008).​ ​While​ ​peer​ ​support​ ​is ​ ​less​ ​individualized ​ ​and​ ​more 
community ​ ​oriented,​ ​the​ ​majority ​ ​of​ ​these​ ​treatment​ ​options​ ​ignore​ ​the​ ​material​ ​and​ ​structural 
conditions​ ​of​ ​racism,​ ​sexism​ ​and​ ​poverty​ ​that​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​a​ ​person’s​ ​mental​ ​distress,​ ​placing 
the​ ​onus​ ​of​ ​recovery​ ​on​ ​the​ ​individual ​ ​with​ ​a​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability.​ ​This​ ​paper​ ​offers ​ ​a 
feminist​ ​materialist​ ​framework​ ​that​ ​attends​ ​to​ ​the​ ​caring​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with​ ​psychiatric 
disabilities​ ​while​ ​highlighting​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​these​ ​needs​ ​are​ ​often​ ​gendered​ ​and​ ​racialized. 
My ​ ​own ​ ​concept ​ ​of​ ​feminist​ ​materialism​ ​in​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​draws​ ​on​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of 
Price ​ ​and​ ​feminist​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​scholar​ ​Nirmala​ ​Erevelles,​ ​who​ ​have​ ​both​ ​moved​ ​the 
conversation​ ​surrounding​ ​care​ ​and​ ​mental​ ​disability​ ​forward​ ​in​ ​highly​ ​generative​ ​ways. 
Erevelles​ ​situates​ ​the​ ​construction​ ​of​ ​disability​ ​within​ ​the​ ​broader​ ​material​ ​frameworks​ ​of 
transnational ​ ​capitalism​ ​and​ ​exploitation.​ ​This ​ ​includes​ ​“historical​ ​and​ ​economic​ ​conditions 
that​ ​situate​ ​becoming​ ​disabled​ ​in​ ​a​ ​violent​ ​context​ ​of​ ​social​ ​and​ ​economic​ ​exploitation​ ​that 
may ​ ​inhibit​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​complicate​ ​oppositional/transgressive​ ​theorizations​ ​of​ ​disabled 
subjectivity”​ ​(Erevelles,​ ​2011a, ​ ​p.​ ​38).​ ​Erevelles,​ ​in​ ​particular,​ ​challenges​ ​post-structuralist 
and​ ​humanist ​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​scholars​ ​for​ ​not​ ​adequately​ ​addressing​ ​the​ ​material 
oppressions​ ​created​ ​by​ ​transnational​ ​capitalism,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​racism,​ ​sexism​ ​and​ ​classism. 
Erevelles​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​the​ ​humanist​ ​transgressive​ ​possibilities​ ​of​ ​disabled​ ​subjectivity​ ​theorized 
by ​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​scholars​ ​Tanya​ ​Titchkosky​ ​and​ ​Margaret​ ​Shildrick,​ ​unintentionally 
foregrounds ​ ​“the ​ ​bourgeois​ ​non-racialized​ ​disabled​ ​subject​ ​with​ ​the​ ​‘material’​ ​freedom​ ​to 
offer​ ​a​ ​more​ ​transgressive​ ​reading​ ​of​ ​disabled ​ ​subjectivity”​ ​(Erevelles,​ ​2011a,​ ​p.​ ​38).​ ​Price 
builds​ ​on ​ ​the​ ​materialist ​ ​work​ ​of​ ​Erevelles​ ​to ​ ​explore​ ​her​ ​conception​ ​of​ ​“bodymind,”​ ​which 
she​ ​defines​ ​as​ ​“a​ ​socio-politically ​ ​constituted​ ​and​ ​material​ ​entity​ ​that​ ​emerges​ ​through​ ​both 
structural​ ​(power-​ ​and​ ​violence-laden)​ ​contexts​ ​and​ ​also​ ​individual​ ​(specific)​ ​experience” 
(Price,​ ​2015, ​ ​p.​ ​271).​ ​The​ ​conflux​ ​of​ ​sociopolitical​ ​constructions ​ ​and​ ​material​ ​entities​ ​that 
define​ ​“bodymind,”​ ​for​ ​example,​ ​as​ ​emerging​ ​from​ ​“structural”​ ​contexts,​ ​such​ ​as 
transnational ​ ​capitalism, ​ ​as​ ​well ​ ​as​ ​individual​ ​experience​ ​are​ ​crucial​ ​to​ ​my​ ​own 
understandings​ ​of​ ​care​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to ​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability. 
I​ ​begin​ ​with​ ​a​ ​review​ ​of​ ​current​ ​disability​ ​studies ​ ​literature​ ​surrounding​ ​care,​ ​as​ ​well 
as​ ​current​ ​mental ​ ​health​ ​literature​ ​on​ ​self-determination.​ ​Utilizing​ ​an​ ​autoethnographic 
approach,​ ​I​ ​explore​ ​my​ ​own​ ​complex​ ​relationship​ ​to​ ​care​ ​and​ ​self-determination,​ ​revealing 
the​ ​often-unacknowledged​ ​material​ ​conditions​ ​that​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​mental​ ​distress.​ ​My​ ​varying 
use​ ​of​ ​the​ ​terms​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability​ ​and​ ​mental​ ​distress​ ​is​ ​not​ ​intended​ ​to​ ​conflate​ ​the​ ​two 
identifying​ ​terms,​ ​or​ ​to ​ ​establish​ ​unintended​ ​hierarchies​ ​in​ ​regards ​ ​to​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability. 
My ​ ​use​ ​of​ ​the​ ​two​ ​terms​ ​is​ ​meant​ ​to​ ​acknowledge​ ​the​ ​differing​ ​ways​ ​people​ ​I​ ​have​ ​spoken​ ​to 
define​ ​and ​ ​articulate​ ​their​ ​experiences​ ​with​ ​what​ ​is ​ ​commonly​ ​diagnosed​ ​as​ ​depression, 
psychosis,​ ​anxiety,​ ​mania,​ ​etc.​ ​From​ ​my​ ​own​ ​perspective,​ ​identifying​ ​as ​ ​having​ ​a​ ​psychiatric 
disability ​ ​includes​ ​the​ ​experience​ ​of​ ​mental​ ​distress.​ ​However​ ​the​ ​experience​ ​of​ ​mental 
distress​ ​does​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​result ​ ​in​ ​identifying ​ ​as​ ​a​ ​person​ ​with​ ​a​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability.​ ​I 
draw​ ​on​ ​a​ ​feminist ​ ​materialist ​ ​framework​ ​(Erevelles,​ ​2011c)​ ​to​ ​demonstrate​ ​the​ ​ways​ ​in 
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struggling​ ​with​ ​mental​ ​distress​ ​who​ ​also​ ​navigate​ ​the​ ​intersectional​ ​oppressions​ ​of​ ​sexism, 
racism​ ​and​ ​poverty.​ ​I​ ​argue​ ​for​ ​a​ ​politics​ ​of​ ​care​ ​that​ ​attends​ ​to​ ​these​ ​needs.​ ​In​ ​particular,​ ​I 
attend​ ​to​ ​Erevelles’​ ​feminist ​ ​materialist​ ​framework​ ​that​ ​places​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​disability​ ​in​ ​the 
broader​ ​context​ ​of​ ​transnational ​ ​capitalism. 
Dependency,​ ​Interdependency​ ​and​ ​Care 
Disability​ ​studies​ ​scholars​ ​who​ ​take​ ​up​ ​issues​ ​of​ ​care​ ​theorize​ ​about​ ​how ​ ​best​ ​to 
address​ ​the​ ​care​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​individuals​ ​with​ ​disabilities​ ​in​ ​a​ ​number​ ​of​ ​different​ ​ways.​ ​One​ ​line 
of​ ​scholarship​ ​demonstrates​ ​how​ ​social​ ​policy​ ​has​ ​failed​ ​to ​ ​adequately​ ​address​ ​problems ​ ​of 
exploitation​ ​and​ ​abuse​ ​that​ ​affect​ ​both​ ​caregivers​ ​and​ ​care-receivers.​ ​Other​ ​scholars,​ ​drawing 
on ​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​humanism​ ​and ​ ​post-structuralism,​ ​argue​ ​for​ ​a​ ​complete​ ​dissolution​ ​of​ ​the​ ​divide 
between ​ ​carer​ ​and​ ​care-recipient,​ ​while​ ​still​ ​others​ ​assert​ ​that​ ​a​ ​dissolution​ ​of​ ​these​ ​roles ​ ​is 
not​ ​possible,​ ​or​ ​even​ ​desirable​ ​given​ ​the​ ​current​ ​context​ ​of​ ​exploitation ​ ​of​ ​care-workers​ ​and 
the​ ​oppression​ ​of​ ​persons​ ​with ​ ​disabilities ​ ​within​ ​transnational​ ​capitalism​ ​(Erevelles,​ ​2011b; 
Kelly,​ ​2016;​ ​Kittay,​ ​2011;​ ​Shakespeare,​ ​2000;​ ​Watson​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2004). 
Tom​ ​Shakespeare​ ​(2000)​ ​is​ ​a​ ​disability ​ ​studies​ ​scholar​ ​who​ ​is​ ​particularly​ ​influential 
in​ ​moving​ ​conversations​ ​surrounding ​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​theory​ ​and​ ​disability​ ​policy​ ​forward​ ​in 
productive ​ ​ways.​ ​In​ ​regards​ ​to​ ​care​ ​for​ ​disabled​ ​people​ ​his​ ​work​ ​expands​ ​and​ ​complicates​ ​the 
arguments​ ​of​ ​the​ ​independent ​ ​living ​ ​model​ ​(IL),​ ​which ​ ​asserts​ ​that​ ​the​ ​relationship​ ​between 
disabled​ ​people​ ​and​ ​their​ ​personal​ ​care​ ​attendants ​ ​(PCA)​ ​is​ ​a​ ​strictly​ ​economic​ ​interaction 
between ​ ​the​ ​employer,​ ​the​ ​person ​ ​with​ ​a​ ​disability,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​employee,​ ​the​ ​PCA.​ ​Shakespeare 
suggests​ ​that​ ​the​ ​IL​ ​model ​ ​is​ ​a​ ​major​ ​advance​ ​in​ ​providing ​ ​adequate​ ​services​ ​to​ ​disabled 
people,​ ​but​ ​care​ ​for​ ​disabled​ ​people​ ​still​ ​needs​ ​to ​ ​be​ ​reformed.​ ​This​ ​reform​ ​can​ ​happen ​ ​by 
balancing ​ ​the ​ ​IL​ ​model, ​ ​based​ ​on​ ​an​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​rights​ ​(and​ ​rules),​ ​with​ ​a​ ​feminist​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​care, 
based​ ​on ​ ​relationships​ ​and​ ​responsibilities​ ​(p.​ ​60).​ ​A​ ​feminist​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​care​ ​provides​ ​a 
framework​ ​to​ ​challenge​ ​prevailing​ ​Western​ ​notions​ ​of​ ​autonomy​ ​and​ ​independence.​ ​It​ ​focuses 
on ​ ​the​ ​moral​ ​components​ ​of​ ​human​ ​connectedness​ ​and​ ​the​ ​maintenance​ ​of​ ​relationships 
through​ ​which​ ​our​ ​obligations​ ​to ​ ​others ​ ​are​ ​both​ ​acknowledged​ ​and​ ​put​ ​into​ ​practice.​ ​The 
ethic ​ ​of​ ​rights​ ​is​ ​considered​ ​more​ ​masculine​ ​centered​ ​and​ ​focuses ​ ​on​ ​independence, 
autonomy,​ ​freedom​ ​and​ ​the​ ​choice​ ​of​ ​the​ ​individual,​ ​especially ​ ​with​ ​regard​ ​to​ ​moral​ ​reasoning 
(Clement, ​ ​1996,​ ​p.​ ​11-13;​ ​Gilligan,​ ​1989,​ ​p.55;​ ​Larrabee,​ ​1993,​ ​p.​ ​3-5).​ ​Shakespeare​ ​(2000) 
concludes​ ​that ​ ​the​ ​social ​ ​problem​ ​of​ ​care,​ ​in​ ​which​ ​the​ ​rights​ ​of​ ​disabled​ ​care​ ​recipients​ ​are 
ignored​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​balanced​ ​with​ ​the​ ​relational​ ​and​ ​moral​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​care-giving​ ​and 
receiving:​ ​“empowered​ ​disabled​ ​people​ ​will​ ​achieve​ ​a​ ​better​ ​quality​ ​of​ ​life​ ​in​ ​a​ ​community​ ​in 
which​ ​each​ ​recognizes​ ​their​ ​responsibility​ ​to​ ​the​ ​other,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​a​ ​world​ ​made​ ​up​ ​of 
competing ​ ​and​ ​selfish​ ​individuals​ ​seeking​ ​to​ ​maximize​ ​their​ ​own​ ​advantage”​ ​(p.​ ​64). 
The​ ​work​ ​of​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​scholars ​ ​Nick​ ​Watson,​ ​Linda​ ​Mckie,​ ​Debra​ ​Hopkins 
Bill​ ​Hughes​ ​and​ ​Sue​ ​Gregory ​ ​has​ ​been​ ​particularly​ ​influential​ ​in​ ​bridging​ ​the​ ​divide​ ​between 
feminist​ ​and​ ​disability​ ​perspectives​ ​on​ ​care​ ​(Watson​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2004;​ ​Hughes​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2005). 
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attention​ ​to​ ​the​ ​material​ ​and ​ ​emotional​ ​labor​ ​of​ ​caregiving,​ ​especially​ ​as ​ ​it​ ​relates ​ ​to​ ​gender 
(p.​ ​334).​ ​The​ ​authors​ ​highlight ​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​the​ ​IL​ ​movement​ ​for​ ​disabled​ ​people,​ ​which 
allows​ ​people​ ​to​ ​hire ​ ​personal ​ ​assistants​ ​(PAs),​ ​frames​ ​care​ ​as​ ​a​ ​business​ ​relationship​ ​between 
an ​ ​employer​ ​and​ ​employee.​ ​Watson​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​there​ ​are​ ​two​ ​key​ ​problems​ ​with​ ​such​ ​a 
utilitarian​ ​framework.​ ​First,​ ​it​ ​negates​ ​the​ ​“reciprocity​ ​and​ ​emotional​ ​involvement”​ ​(p.​ ​338) 
that​ ​naturally​ ​occurs​ ​in​ ​caring​ ​relationships.​ ​Second,​ ​by​ ​focusing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​empowerment​ ​of​ ​the 
disabled​ ​person,​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​exploitation​ ​of​ ​the​ ​assistant​ ​is​ ​ignored​ ​(p.​ ​338).​ ​The​ ​authors​ ​cite 
feminist​ ​scholars​ ​who​ ​have​ ​explored​ ​both​ ​the​ ​emotional​ ​and​ ​practical​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​care​ ​work 
and​ ​described ​ ​the​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​which​ ​this​ ​work ​ ​is​ ​gendered.​ ​That​ ​is,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​a​ ​social 
construction​ ​that​ ​upholds​ ​gender​ ​hierarchies,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​considered​ ​“natural”​ ​for​ ​women​ ​to​ ​take​ ​on 
the​ ​majority​ ​of​ ​caring​ ​responsibilities​ ​(p.​ ​334).​ ​Building​ ​on ​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​“caringscapes,”​ ​a 
feminist​ ​framework​ ​that​ ​incorporates​ ​both​ ​the​ ​spatial​ ​and​ ​temporal​ ​to​ ​address ​ ​the​ ​complex 
ways​ ​in ​ ​which ​ ​caring​ ​is​ ​conducted ​ ​on​ ​a​ ​day​ ​to​ ​day​ ​basis,​ ​the​ ​authors​ ​introduce​ ​the​ ​term 
“needscapes.”​ ​Needscapes​ ​is​ ​a​ ​framework​ ​that​ ​acknowledges​ ​the​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​everyone​ ​at​ ​some 
point​ ​in​ ​their​ ​lives​ ​will ​ ​need​ ​to​ ​be​ ​cared​ ​for​ ​and​ ​will​ ​also ​ ​participate​ ​in​ ​caring.​ ​This 
acknowledges​ ​the​ ​ways​ ​in​ ​which​ ​needs​ ​are​ ​continually​ ​lived​ ​“through​ ​struggle,​ ​contradiction 
and​ ​flux”​ ​(p.​ ​345).​ ​By ​ ​highlighting​ ​the​ ​(inter)​ ​dependency​ ​and​ ​need​ ​that​ ​all​ ​people​ ​will 
experience​ ​at ​ ​some​ ​point​ ​in​ ​their​ ​life​ ​course,​ ​needscapes​ ​becomes​ ​a​ ​“discourse​ ​bridge” 
between ​ ​the​ ​often-competing​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​and​ ​feminist​ ​perspectives ​ ​on​ ​care​ ​(p.​ ​331). 
In​ ​a​ ​more​ ​recent ​ ​article​ ​Hughes​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​(2005)​ ​address​ ​further​ ​possibilities​ ​for​ ​bridging 
the​ ​divide ​ ​between​ ​the​ ​Disabled​ ​People’s​ ​Movement​ ​(DPM)​ ​and​ ​the​ ​feminist​ ​movement’s 
conceptions​ ​of​ ​care​ ​through​ ​a​ ​theoretical​ ​framework​ ​provided​ ​by​ ​post-feminist​ ​philosopher 
Luce​ ​Irigary.​ ​The​ ​authors​ ​utilize​ ​Irigary’s​ ​framework​ ​of​ ​the​ ​othered​ ​“female​ ​imaginary”​ ​to 
move​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​gendered ​ ​binaries​ ​established​ ​by​ ​the​ ​DPM​ ​and​ ​the​ ​feminist​ ​movement​ ​in 
regards​ ​to​ ​care​ ​(Hughes​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2005,​ ​p.​ ​260).​ ​Watson​ ​et.​ ​al​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​care​ ​relations​ ​situate 
both​ ​care​ ​providers​ ​and ​ ​care​ ​recipients​ ​in​ ​a​ ​“feminized​ ​social​ ​space.”​ ​“The​ ​feminization​ ​of 
care​ ​in ​ ​a​ ​phallocentric​ ​culture​ ​makes​ ​participants ​ ​in​ ​the​ ​caring​ ​relationship–​ ​regardless ​ ​of 
gender​ ​identity​ ​–​ ​necessarily​ ​subordinate”​ ​(p.​ ​260).​ ​By​ ​privileging​ ​the​ ​autonomy​ ​of​ ​the 
disabled​ ​person​ ​in​ ​the​ ​caring​ ​relationship​ ​and​ ​situating​ ​the​ ​carer​ ​as​ ​an ​ ​employee,​ ​the​ ​authors 
argue​ ​that​ ​the​ ​DSM​ ​movement​ ​remains​ ​firmly​ ​situated​ ​in​ ​the​ ​dominant​ ​“masculine 
imaginary”​ ​(p.​ ​268).​ ​“To ​ ​be​ ​a​ ​carer​ ​or​ ​cared​ ​for​ ​–​ ​male​ ​or​ ​female,​ ​disabled​ ​or​ ​nondisabled​ ​in 
either​ ​role ​ ​–​ ​is​ ​to​ ​be ​ ​found​ ​wanting,​ ​to​ ​be​ ​other​ ​in ​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​the​ ​masculine​ ​subject​ ​of 
modernity,​ ​to​ ​be​ ​reduced​ ​to ​ ​‘the​ ​other​ ​of​ ​the​ ​same’”​ ​(p.​ ​265).​ ​As​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​a​ ​marginalized 
other​ ​always​ ​defined​ ​“in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​the​ ​masculine​ ​subject​ ​of​ ​modernity,”​ ​Hughes​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​argue 
that​ ​the​ ​“relational​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​the​ ​caring​ ​process,​ ​its​ ​tactility,​ ​fluidity​ ​and​ ​embodied 
difference”​ ​have​ ​the​ ​potential ​ ​to​ ​give​ ​the​ ​“othering​ ​and​ ​difference”​ ​that​ ​defines​ ​the​ ​caring 
relationship​ ​“social ​ ​and​ ​symbolic​ ​representation”​ ​(Whitford,​ ​1991a,​ ​p.​ ​24,​ ​as​ ​cited ​ ​in​ ​Hughes 
et​ ​al.,​ ​2005,​ ​p.​ ​265).​ ​By ​ ​situating​ ​the​ ​caring​ ​relationship​ ​as ​ ​valuable​ ​in​ ​its​ ​own​ ​right,​ ​as 
separate ​ ​from​ ​the​ ​masculine​ ​image,​ ​Hughes ​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​open​ ​up​ ​opportunities ​ ​for​ ​a​ ​more​ ​ethical​ ​and 
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Feminist​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​scholar​ ​Christine​ ​Kelly​ ​(2013,​ ​2016)​ ​more​ ​recently 
illustrates​ ​the​ ​importance​ ​of​ ​accessibility​ ​in ​ ​bridging​ ​the​ ​divide​ ​between​ ​disability​ ​studies​ ​and 
feminist​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​care​ ​by​ ​developing​ ​the​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​accessible​ ​care.​ ​She​ ​cites​ ​disability 
studies​ ​scholars’​ ​assertions​ ​that​ ​care​ ​is​ ​a​ ​potentially​ ​oppressive​ ​practice​ ​if​ ​the​ ​care​ ​is​ ​not 
directed ​ ​by ​ ​disabled​ ​people.​ ​Kelly​ ​acknowledges​ ​that​ ​“disability​ ​critiques ​ ​of​ ​care​ ​also ​ ​have 
limits​ ​as​ ​they​ ​often​ ​ignore​ ​the​ ​gendered​ ​nature​ ​of​ ​care​ ​work​ ​and​ ​the​ ​potential​ ​to​ ​oppress ​ ​the 
individuals​ ​who​ ​work​ ​as​ ​care​ ​providers,​ ​many​ ​of​ ​whom​ ​are​ ​transnational​ ​and​ ​racialized 
subjects”​ ​(2013,​ ​p.​ ​786).​ ​Kelly​ ​proposes​ ​accessible​ ​care,​ ​a​ ​fluid​ ​approach,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​conceptual 
framework​ ​through​ ​which ​ ​to​ ​tease​ ​out ​ ​the​ ​complexities​ ​of​ ​topics ​ ​such​ ​as​ ​attendant​ ​services​ ​as 
well​ ​as​ ​other​ ​care​ ​issues,​ ​providing ​ ​no​ ​easy​ ​answers​ ​(2013,​ ​p.​ ​795):​ ​Accessible​ ​care,​ ​and​ ​the 
bridges​ ​it​ ​builds,​ ​offers​ ​an ​ ​important​ ​contribution​ ​to​ ​disability​ ​and​ ​feminist​ ​scholars​ ​to​ ​move 
beyond ​ ​both​ ​adversarial​ ​debate​ ​and​ ​a​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​‘common​ ​ground’​ ​to​ ​explore​ ​attendant 
services, ​ ​and​ ​other​ ​care​ ​arrangements​ ​and​ ​issues,​ ​with​ ​a​ ​multifaceted​ ​approach​ ​situated​ ​in​ ​the 
realities​ ​of​ ​contemporary,​ ​globalized​ ​socioeconomic​ ​systems ​ ​(2013,​ ​p.​ ​796). 
The​ ​flexibility​ ​of​ ​Kelly’s​ ​framework​ ​builds​ ​many​ ​connections​ ​between​ ​experience​ ​and 
theory,​ ​acknowledges​ ​(even​ ​embraces)​ ​the​ ​tension ​ ​between​ ​feminist​ ​and​ ​disability​ ​studies 
theories​ ​of​ ​care​ ​and​ ​positions​ ​discussions ​ ​of​ ​care​ ​within​ ​transnational​ ​contexts. 
Contextualizing​ ​the​ ​care​ ​debate​ ​within​ ​our​ ​current​ ​socioeconomic​ ​situation​ ​helps​ ​to​ ​address 
the​ ​complexities​ ​and​ ​nuances​ ​of​ ​various​ ​approaches ​ ​to​ ​care.  
Feminist​ ​philosopher​ ​Eva​ ​Kittay​ ​has ​ ​published​ ​particularly​ ​influential​ ​work​ ​on​ ​care​ ​in 
regards​ ​to​ ​people​ ​with​ ​profound​ ​cognitive​ ​disabilities.​ ​Kittay​ ​(2011)​ ​stresses​ ​that​ ​in​ ​many 
cases​ ​the​ ​relationship ​ ​between​ ​caregivers​ ​and​ ​care​ ​recipients​ ​will​ ​remain​ ​inherently​ ​unequal. 
She​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​the​ ​IL​ ​movement’s​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​autonomy​ ​fails​ ​to​ ​acknowledge​ ​that​ ​some​ ​people 
with​ ​disabilities,​ ​particularly ​ ​those ​ ​with​ ​profound​ ​cognitive​ ​disabilities,​ ​will​ ​never​ ​achieve 
autonomy.​ ​Kittay ​ ​utilizes​ ​the ​ ​term​ ​“ourselves”​ ​to​ ​encompass​ ​all​ ​of​ ​society,​ ​disabled ​ ​and 
nondisabled,​ ​who​ ​will ​ ​inevitably​ ​require​ ​care​ ​at​ ​some​ ​point​ ​in​ ​the​ ​life​ ​course.​ ​By​ ​seeing 
ourselves​ ​as​ ​always​ ​in​ ​relation​ ​to​ ​each​ ​other,​ ​Kittay​ ​acknowledges​ ​that​ ​people's​ ​sense​ ​of 
well-being ​ ​is​ ​directly​ ​tied​ ​to​ ​both​ ​the​ ​giving​ ​and​ ​receiving​ ​of​ ​care​ ​(p.​ ​54).​ ​Rather​ ​than 
focusing​ ​on​ ​autonomy, ​ ​social ​ ​policy​ ​and​ ​care​ ​practice​ ​can​ ​provide​ ​equal​ ​opportunity​ ​for​ ​a​ ​life 
of​ ​dignity​ ​and ​ ​value​ ​to​ ​everyone​ ​as​ ​the​ ​end​ ​goal​ ​of​ ​justice.​ ​Kittay​ ​uses​ ​her​ ​daughter,​ ​who​ ​is​ ​an 
adult​ ​with ​ ​a​ ​profound​ ​cognitive ​ ​disability,​ ​as​ ​an​ ​example,​ ​stating​ ​“no​ ​accommodations, 
antidiscrimination​ ​laws,​ ​or​ ​guarantees​ ​of​ ​equal​ ​opportunity ​ ​can​ ​make​ ​her​ ​self-supporting​ ​and 
independent”​ ​(p.​ ​56).​ ​While​ ​Kittay​ ​does​ ​not​ ​completely​ ​ignore​ ​social​ ​policy,​ ​she​ ​suggests​ ​that 
the​ ​distribution​ ​of​ ​care​ ​resources​ ​demonstrates ​ ​that​ ​feminist​ ​care​ ​ethics​ ​is​ ​not​ ​only​ ​suited ​ ​to 
the​ ​private​ ​and ​ ​intimate​ ​sphere​ ​but ​ ​also​ ​to ​ ​the​ ​public.​ ​She​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​a​ ​society​ ​that​ ​embraces 
a​ ​feminist​ ​ethic ​ ​of​ ​care​ ​can​ ​begin​ ​to​ ​combat​ ​the​ ​“fear​ ​and​ ​loathing​ ​of​ ​dependency​ ​and​ ​with ​ ​it, 
disability”​ ​(p.​ ​56-57).​ ​However,​ ​many​ ​scholars​ ​would​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​the​ ​current​ ​transnational 
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Materialist​ ​Structures​ ​of​ ​Care 
Disability​ ​Studies​ ​scholar​ ​Nirmala​ ​Erevelles​ ​(2011c)​ ​analyzes​ ​the​ ​material​ ​conditions 
of​ ​citizenship ​ ​for​ ​people​ ​with​ ​cognitive​ ​and​ ​profound​ ​disabilities,​ ​intervening​ ​in​ ​conversations 
about​ ​dependency,​ ​autonomy​ ​and​ ​rationality.​ ​She​ ​begins ​ ​her​ ​discussion​ ​by​ ​criticizing 
humanist​ ​assumptions​ ​about​ ​citizenship​ ​that​ ​focus ​ ​on​ ​rationality,​ ​autonomy​ ​and​ ​competence. 
Such​ ​assumptions​ ​about ​ ​the​ ​human​ ​leave​ ​people​ ​with ​ ​profound/cognitive​ ​disabilities ​ ​on ​ ​the 
margins​ ​of​ ​citizenship.​ ​“Notions​ ​of​ ​citizenship,​ ​rationality ​ ​and​ ​autonomy​ ​are​ ​ideological 
categories​ ​that ​ ​are​ ​constituted​ ​within​ ​the​ ​historical​ ​and​ ​material​ ​conditions​ ​of​ ​capitalism”​ ​(p. 
164-5).​ ​The​ ​implication​ ​of​ ​Erevelles’​ ​argument​ ​is​ ​an​ ​“alternative​ ​theorization​ ​of​ ​citizenship 
and​ ​citizenship​ ​education​ ​that​ ​is​ ​not​ ​just​ ​inclusive​ ​of​ ​difference,​ ​but​ ​is ​ ​also​ ​transformative​ ​in 
its​ ​intent​ ​and​ ​practices”​ ​(p.​ ​150).​ ​Erevelles​ ​challenges​ ​Kittay's​ ​argument​ ​that​ ​the​ ​meaning​ ​of 
dependency​ ​“can​ ​be​ ​renegotiated​ ​outside​ ​the​ ​material​ ​conditions​ ​within​ ​which​ ​it​ ​is​ ​situated” 
(p.​ ​160).​ ​She​ ​argues,​ ​rather,​ ​that ​ ​the​ ​historical,​ ​materialist​ ​normative​ ​structures ​ ​that​ ​enforce 
binaries​ ​such​ ​as​ ​rationality/irrationality​ ​and​ ​autonomy/dependence​ ​still​ ​exist,​ ​so​ ​they​ ​cannot 
yet​ ​be​ ​dissolved​ ​or​ ​transgressed​ ​as​ ​Kittay​ ​and​ ​some​ ​post-structural​ ​theories​ ​of​ ​citizenship 
focused​ ​on​ ​the​ ​discursive​ ​realm​ ​suggest​ ​(p.​ ​164).​ ​Erevelles​ ​says,​ ​“I​ ​argue​ ​here​ ​that​ ​neither 
formal​ ​justice​ ​nor​ ​discursive ​ ​interventions​ ​that​ ​deconstruct​ ​reason​ ​and​ ​privilege​ ​dependency 
over​ ​autonomy​ ​will ​ ​prove​ ​to​ ​be​ ​emancipatory​ ​for​ ​people​ ​with​ ​severe/cognitive​ ​disabilities, 
because​ ​both​ ​reason​ ​and ​ ​dependency​ ​are​ ​historically​ ​constituted​ ​within​ ​the​ ​laissez-faire 
economic ​ ​structures​ ​of​ ​capitalist ​ ​societies”​ ​(p.​ ​160). 
Erevelles​ ​challenges​ ​common​ ​interventions​ ​into​ ​the​ ​care​ ​debate​ ​by​ ​feminist, 
poststructuralist​ ​and​ ​disability ​ ​studies​ ​scholars ​ ​who​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​the​ ​means​ ​to​ ​ameliorate​ ​the 
fear​ ​and​ ​hatred​ ​of​ ​disability​ ​and​ ​establish​ ​justice​ ​for​ ​all​ ​(including​ ​care​ ​givers​ ​and ​ ​receivers) ​ ​is 
to​ ​embrace​ ​the​ ​dependency​ ​that​ ​everyone​ ​experiences​ ​at​ ​some​ ​point​ ​in​ ​their​ ​life​ ​course.​ ​While 
such ​ ​interventions​ ​may​ ​trouble​ ​discursive​ ​terms​ ​such​ ​as​ ​autonomy/dependency,​ ​these​ ​binaries 
remain ​ ​foundational ​ ​to​ ​the​ ​capitalist ​ ​economic​ ​structures​ ​that​ ​shape​ ​our​ ​society. 
Erevelles​ ​argues​ ​for​ ​a​ ​materialist​ ​transformative​ ​politic​ ​that​ ​will​ ​affect​ ​notions ​ ​of 
citizenship,​ ​care​ ​and​ ​autonomy​ ​for​ ​both​ ​caregivers​ ​and​ ​care​ ​receivers.​ ​Erevelles ​ ​challenges 
theories​ ​of​ ​relations​ ​between​ ​bodies​ ​as​ ​defining​ ​affective​ ​citizenship.​ ​She​ ​utilizes ​ ​feminist 
scholar​ ​Sara​ ​Ahmed’s​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​“affective​ ​economies”​ ​in​ ​which​ ​emotions ​ ​are​ ​crucial​ ​to 
locating​ ​‘“individuals​ ​with​ ​communities—or​ ​bodily​ ​space​ ​with​ ​social​ ​space—through​ ​the 
very ​ ​intensity​ ​of​ ​their​ ​attachments”’​ ​(Ahmed,​ ​2004,​ ​p.​ ​119,​ ​as ​ ​cited​ ​in​ ​Erevelles,​ ​2011c,​ ​p. 
174).​ ​Erevelles​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​Ahmed’s​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​affective​ ​economies ​ ​potentially​ ​opens​ ​up 
possibilities​ ​for​ ​“a​ ​recognition​ ​of​ ​disabled​ ​subjects​ ​as​ ​social​ ​subjects ​ ​located​ ​within​ ​reciprocal 
relationships” ​ ​because​ ​“emotions​ ​(affects)​ ​do ​ ​not​ ​reside​ ​in​ ​bodies​ ​but​ ​between​ ​bodies 
(author’s​ ​emphasis),​ ​and​ ​therefore​ ​emotions ​ ​become​ ​the​ ​critical​ ​building​ ​block​ ​of​ ​most​ ​social 
relationships” ​ ​(2011c,​ ​p.​ ​174).​ ​However,​ ​Erevelles ​ ​contends​ ​that​ ​Ahmed’s​ ​theories​ ​of 
affective​ ​economies​ ​ignore​ ​the​ ​“material​ ​context​ ​within​ ​which ​ ​these​ ​relationships​ ​occur—a 
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and​ ​care​ ​recipient”​ ​(p.​ ​174).​ ​She​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​a​ ​feminist​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​care​ ​that​ ​emphasizes 
interdependence​ ​in​ ​the​ ​domestic​ ​role,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​theories​ ​that​ ​argue​ ​the​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​care​ ​is 
exploitative​ ​to​ ​female​ ​carers,​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​rely​ ​on​ ​problematic​ ​humanist​ ​notions​ ​of​ ​autonomy. 
Erevelles​ ​acknowledges​ ​the​ ​admirable​ ​work​ ​of​ ​Margrit​ ​Shildrick​ ​in​ ​feminist​ ​disability 
studies.​ ​However,​ ​she​ ​suggests​ ​that​ ​in​ ​regards​ ​to​ ​addressing​ ​an​ ​ethics​ ​of​ ​care​ ​in​ ​transnational 
contexts,​ ​Shildrick​ ​relies​ ​on​ ​a​ ​problematic​ ​dissolution​ ​of​ ​the​ ​dialectic​ ​between​ ​caregiver​ ​and 
care​ ​recipient.​ ​“Here,​ ​production​ ​is​ ​disassociated​ ​from​ ​the​ ​concrete​ ​activities ​ ​of​ ​labor​ ​(the 
materiality​ ​of​ ​caring​ ​work)​ ​and​ ​reattached​ ​to​ ​affective​ ​relationships​ ​that​ ​emerge​ ​as ​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of 
activities​ ​of​ ​consumption​ ​(receiving​ ​care).”​ ​As​ ​Erevelles ​ ​notes,​ ​the​ ​collapse​ ​of​ ​the​ ​division 
between ​ ​production​ ​and​ ​consumption​ ​“has ​ ​profound​ ​implications​ ​for​ ​not​ ​only​ ​articulating​ ​an 
ethics​ ​of​ ​care,​ ​but​ ​also​ ​for​ ​articulating​ ​a​ ​transformative​ ​theory​ ​of​ ​disabled​ ​subjectivity” 
(2011c,​ ​p.​ ​194). ​ ​Yet,​ ​Erevelles​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​the​ ​idealism​ ​of​ ​Shildrick’s​ ​argument​ ​ignores​ ​the 
materialist​ ​conditions​ ​of​ ​poverty ​ ​and​ ​unequal​ ​pay​ ​as ​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​sexism​ ​and​ ​racism​ ​that 
continue​ ​to​ ​structure​ ​the​ ​caring​ ​relationship,​ ​particularly​ ​in​ ​the​ ​broader​ ​context​ ​of 
transnational,​ ​capitalist​ ​production​ ​(2011c,​ ​p.​ ​194).​ ​To​ ​support​ ​her​ ​argument,​ ​Erevelles​ ​cites 
feminist​ ​scholar​ ​Julie​ ​Torrant's​ ​contention​ ​that​ ​“affective​ ​needs​ ​can​ ​be​ ​realized​ ​if​ ​and​ ​only​ ​if 
basic ​ ​needs​ ​are​ ​met”​ ​(p.​ ​195). 
I​ ​agree​ ​with​ ​Torrent’s​ ​argument​ ​to​ ​a​ ​point.​ ​However,​ ​in​ ​regards​ ​to ​ ​people​ ​with 
psychiatric​ ​disabilities,​ ​in​ ​particular,​ ​the​ ​relationship ​ ​between​ ​basic​ ​and​ ​affective​ ​(or 
emotional)​ ​needs​ ​is​ ​more​ ​complex.​ ​Many​ ​people​ ​with​ ​psychiatric​ ​disabilities,​ ​particularly 
those​ ​marginalized ​ ​by​ ​racism​ ​and ​ ​poverty​ ​as ​ ​well,​ ​do​ ​need​ ​attention​ ​and​ ​care​ ​in​ ​regards​ ​to 
their​ ​affective​ ​needs​ ​in ​ ​order​ ​to​ ​sustain​ ​the​ ​more​ ​basic,​ ​material​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​housing​ ​and​ ​food. 
These​ ​material ​ ​needs​ ​may​ ​seem​ ​inconsequential​ ​to​ ​someone​ ​experiencing​ ​extreme​ ​mental 
distress​ ​that​ ​affects​ ​their​ ​emotions​ ​and​ ​the​ ​way​ ​they​ ​process​ ​their​ ​environment​ ​and 
interactions​ ​at​ ​a​ ​given​ ​time.​ ​However,​ ​I​ ​do​ ​argue​ ​that​ ​the​ ​push​ ​for​ ​self-determination,​ ​when​ ​it 
is​ ​not​ ​situated​ ​in​ ​the​ ​broader​ ​material​ ​contexts​ ​of​ ​racism,​ ​sexism​ ​and ​ ​poverty,​ ​neglects​ ​a 
crucial​ ​portion​ ​of​ ​the​ ​population​ ​that​ ​struggles​ ​with​ ​mental​ ​distress.​ ​In​ ​the​ ​context​ ​of​ ​capitalist 
exploitation,​ ​self-determination​ ​becomes​ ​an​ ​option ​ ​for​ ​the​ ​more​ ​privileged​ ​members​ ​of 
society.​ ​​ ​Erevelles​ ​concludes​ ​by​ ​arguing ​ ​that​ ​we​ ​must​ ​always​ ​acknowledge​ ​the​ ​material 
conditions​ ​of​ ​transnational​ ​capitalism​ ​because​ ​these​ ​structures​ ​produce​ ​social​ ​difference 
through​ ​“the​ ​specific​ ​relations​ ​of​ ​production ​ ​and​ ​consumption”​ ​(p.​ ​97).​ ​It​ ​is​ ​only​ ​by 
acknowledging​ ​such ​ ​material ​ ​conditions​ ​that​ ​we​ ​can​ ​transform​ ​the​ ​body​ ​politic​ ​(p.​ ​197).​ ​The 
oppressive​ ​material​ ​conditions​ ​of​ ​capitalism​ ​are​ ​also​ ​highly ​ ​relevant​ ​to ​ ​the​ ​care​ ​needs​ ​of 
people​ ​with​ ​psychiatric​ ​disabilities​ ​and​ ​must​ ​be​ ​further​ ​addressed. 
Placing​ ​Psychiatric​ ​Disability​ ​in​ ​a​ ​Material​ ​Context 
I​ ​agree​ ​with​ ​Erevelle’s​ ​argument,​ ​and​ ​expand​ ​her​ ​discussion​ ​to​ ​the​ ​specific​ ​material 
care​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with​ ​psychiatric​ ​disabilities,​ ​a​ ​disability​ ​category​ ​that​ ​is​ ​underexplored​ ​in 
care-giving​ ​and​ ​care-receiving ​ ​scholarship.​ ​People​ ​with​ ​psychiatric​ ​disabilities​ ​are​ ​situated​ ​in 
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care.​ ​The​ ​social​ ​and ​ ​political​ ​situation​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with​ ​psychiatric​ ​disabilities ​ ​is​ ​complicated​ ​by 
gender,​ ​race​ ​and​ ​class​ ​status—often​ ​unacknowledged​ ​positionalities—that​ ​potentially 
contribute​ ​to​ ​a​ ​person’s​ ​mental​ ​distress.​ ​In​ ​many​ ​cases,​ ​as​ ​my​ ​review ​ ​of​ ​self-determination 
and​ ​recovery​ ​literature​ ​in​ ​the ​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​field​ ​demonstrates ​ ​below,​ ​the​ ​responsibility​ ​for 
mitigating​ ​debilitating​ ​mental​ ​distress​ ​is​ ​placed​ ​on​ ​the​ ​shoulders​ ​of​ ​the​ ​individual,​ ​a 
responsibilization​ ​that​ ​ignores​ ​systemic​ ​and​ ​intersectional​ ​oppressions. 
The​ ​recovery​ ​movement—which​ ​includes​ ​self-determination​ ​as​ ​a​ ​positive​ ​step 
forward—was​ ​started​ ​by​ ​consumer-survivors,​ ​both​ ​those​ ​with​ ​psychiatric​ ​disabilities ​ ​who 
adhere​ ​to​ ​psychiatric​ ​treatment,​ ​and​ ​those​ ​who​ ​consider​ ​themselves​ ​survivors ​ ​of​ ​psychiatric 
treatment​ ​they​ ​did​ ​not ​ ​find ​ ​beneficial.​ ​Recovery,​ ​through​ ​this​ ​movement,​ ​has ​ ​come​ ​to​ ​be 
articulated ​ ​as​ ​“a​ ​process​ ​in​ ​which ​ ​people​ ​are​ ​able​ ​to​ ​live,​ ​work,​ ​learn,​ ​and​ ​participate​ ​fully​ ​in 
their​ ​communities”​ ​(Davidson,​ ​Rakefelt​ ​and​ ​Strauss​ ​as​ ​cited​ ​in​ ​Corrigan​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2012,​ ​p.​ ​170). 
It​ ​is​ ​important​ ​to​ ​note​ ​that​ ​participation​ ​means ​ ​choice​ ​as​ ​directed​ ​by​ ​the​ ​person​ ​with​ ​a 
psychiatric​ ​disability.​ ​Potential ​ ​employment​ ​and​ ​community​ ​participation ​ ​must​ ​revolve 
around​ ​the​ ​goals​ ​of​ ​the​ ​person​ ​in​ ​recovery.​ ​“Recovery​ ​may ​ ​also​ ​imply​ ​the​ ​reduction​ ​or 
complete​ ​remission​ ​of​ ​symptoms”​ ​(Corrigan​ ​et​ ​al,​ ​2012,​ ​p.​ ​170). 
As​ ​Erevelles​ ​argues,​ ​reliance​ ​on​ ​the​ ​affective​ ​economy ​ ​and​ ​choice​ ​of​ ​care-receivers 
does​ ​not​ ​mitigate​ ​the​ ​oppressive​ ​power​ ​structures​ ​of​ ​the​ ​market​ ​economy ​ ​“crisscrossed​ ​by​ ​the 
racial,​ ​sexual​ ​and ​ ​transnational​ ​divisions ​ ​of​ ​labor”​ ​(2011c,​ ​p.​ ​175).​ ​It​ ​becomes​ ​nearly 
impossible​ ​to​ ​explore​ ​notions​ ​of​ ​affective​ ​needs,​ ​self-determination,​ ​dependency​ ​and​ ​care, 
without​ ​also​ ​addressing ​ ​basic​ ​material ​ ​needs​ ​(Erevelles ​ ​2011c;​ ​Torrant,​ ​2002).​ ​Basic​ ​care 
needs​ ​are​ ​also​ ​provided ​ ​primarily​ ​by​ ​women​ ​of​ ​color.​ ​Sociologist​ ​Mignon​ ​Duffy​ ​(2005) 
describes​ ​the​ ​increased ​ ​racialization ​ ​of​ ​low ​ ​wage​ ​care,​ ​distinguishing​ ​between ​ ​care​ ​that 
involves​ ​nurturance​ ​and​ ​a​ ​strong​ ​emotional​ ​component​ ​based​ ​on​ ​human​ ​connection,​ ​and​ ​care 
that​ ​involves​ ​reproductive​ ​labor: ​ ​“Work​ ​that​ ​is​ ​necessary​ ​to​ ​ensure​ ​the​ ​daily​ ​maintenance​ ​and 
ongoing​ ​reproduction​ ​of​ ​the​ ​labor​ ​force”​ ​(p.​ ​70).​ ​Building​ ​on​ ​the​ ​work​ ​of​ ​intersectional 
feminist​ ​scholar​ ​Evelyn​ ​Nakano​ ​Glenn,​ ​Mignon​ ​demonstrates,​ ​through​ ​a​ ​census ​ ​data​ ​analysis 
that​ ​reproductive​ ​labor,​ ​which ​ ​often​ ​includes​ ​the​ ​invisible​ ​labor​ ​of​ ​cleaning​ ​and​ ​cooking​ ​in 
both​ ​institutional ​ ​and​ ​domestic​ ​settings,​ ​not​ ​only ​ ​pays​ ​much​ ​less,​ ​but​ ​is ​ ​primarily​ ​done​ ​by 
women ​ ​of​ ​color​ ​(2005, ​ ​p.​ ​78).​ ​As​ ​Nakano​ ​Glenn​ ​(1992)​ ​points ​ ​out,​ ​“Racial-Ethnic​ ​women​ ​are 
employed ​ ​to​ ​do​ ​the​ ​heavy, ​ ​dirty​ ​‘back-room’​ ​chores​ ​of​ ​cooking​ ​and​ ​serving ​ ​food​ ​in 
restaurants​ ​and​ ​cafeterias,​ ​cleaning ​ ​rooms ​ ​in​ ​hotels​ ​and​ ​office​ ​buildings,​ ​and​ ​caring​ ​for​ ​the 
elderly ​ ​and ​ ​ill​ ​in​ ​hospitals​ ​and​ ​nursing​ ​homes,​ ​including​ ​cleaning​ ​rooms,​ ​making ​ ​beds, 
changing​ ​bed​ ​pans,​ ​and​ ​preparing​ ​food”​ ​(p.​ ​20).​ ​Building​ ​on​ ​these​ ​insights,​ ​I​ ​argue​ ​that 
attending​ ​to ​ ​the​ ​basic​ ​material,​ ​and​ ​often ​ ​gendered​ ​and​ ​racialized,​ ​care​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with 
psychiatric​ ​disabilities​ ​is​ ​an​ ​affirmative​ ​and​ ​necessary ​ ​step​ ​in​ ​mitigating​ ​distress​ ​for​ ​both 
caregivers​ ​and​ ​care-receivers. 
Materiality​ ​must ​ ​be​ ​acknowledged,​ ​and​ ​systemic​ ​oppressions​ ​recognized,​ ​as ​ ​a 
necessary​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​self-determination​ ​and​ ​empowerment​ ​as​ ​a​ ​means​ ​of​ ​recovery.​ ​As​ ​I 
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mental​ ​distress,​ ​so​ ​I​ ​do ​ ​​not​ ​want​ ​to​ ​necessarily ​ ​suggest​ ​that​ ​the​ ​material​ ​needs​ ​should​ ​be​ ​met 
prior​ ​to ​ ​the​ ​affective,​ ​emotional​ ​needs​ ​in​ ​many​ ​cases.​ ​However,​ ​as ​ ​I​ ​will​ ​further​ ​illustrate​ ​in 
the​ ​following ​ ​literature​ ​review,​ ​in​ ​many ​ ​cases ​ ​the​ ​scholars ​ ​advocating​ ​for​ ​self-determination 
often ​ ​frame​ ​managing​ ​housing,​ ​employment​ ​and​ ​community ​ ​integration​ ​as​ ​a​ ​process​ ​of 
self-care​ ​(my​ ​emphasis)​ ​that ​ ​is​ ​the​ ​responsibility​ ​of​ ​the​ ​person​ ​with​ ​a​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability, 
rather​ ​than​ ​a​ ​natural​ ​right​ ​that​ ​all​ ​individuals​ ​should​ ​have​ ​access ​ ​to.​ ​The​ ​material​ ​provisions 
involved ​ ​in​ ​care,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​housing,​ ​meals,​ ​access​ ​to ​ ​supportive​ ​employment​ ​opportunities ​ ​and 
assistance ​ ​with​ ​child​ ​care,​ ​are​ ​crucial​ ​to​ ​supporting​ ​people​ ​navigating​ ​mental​ ​distress.​ ​More 
emphasis​ ​should ​ ​be​ ​placed​ ​on​ ​providing​ ​those​ ​material​ ​provisions,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​requiring,​ ​or 
even​ ​training,​ ​the​ ​individual​ ​with​ ​a​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability ​ ​to​ ​manage​ ​those​ ​provisions ​ ​on​ ​their 
own​ ​through​ ​the​ ​more​ ​abstract​ ​conceptions ​ ​of​ ​self-determination. 
Empowerment,​ ​Autonomy​ ​and​ ​Self-Determination 
Self-determination,​ ​defined​ ​as​ ​the​ ​ability ​ ​to​ ​make​ ​choices ​ ​that​ ​determine​ ​the​ ​course​ ​of 
one’s​ ​life, ​ ​is​ ​currently​ ​being​ ​cited ​ ​by​ ​many​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​researchers,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as ​ ​many​ ​people 
who​ ​identify​ ​as​ ​having​ ​a​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability,​ ​as​ ​a​ ​key​ ​component​ ​of​ ​recovery​ ​(Ryan​ ​&​ ​Deci, 
2000).​ ​Mental​ ​health ​ ​scholar​ ​Larry​ ​Davidson​ ​(2016)​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​this ​ ​new​ ​movement​ ​in​ ​mental 
health​ ​treatment ​ ​incorporating​ ​self-determination,​ ​peer​ ​supports​ ​and​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​navigators 
is​ ​key​ ​to​ ​recovery.​ ​Peer​ ​support ​ ​refers​ ​to​ ​the​ ​training​ ​and​ ​hiring​ ​of​ ​people​ ​who​ ​are​ ​in​ ​recovery 
from​ ​severe​ ​mental ​ ​illness​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​support​ ​for​ ​those​ ​currently​ ​receiving​ ​treatment​ ​in​ ​the 
mental​ ​health​ ​system.​ ​Health​ ​navigators​ ​are​ ​paid​ ​paraprofessionals ​ ​that​ ​assist​ ​people​ ​with 
complex​ ​health​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​navigate​ ​the​ ​health​ ​system.​ ​Navigators​ ​often​ ​help​ ​people​ ​find 
available​ ​care​ ​options​ ​and​ ​provide​ ​support​ ​in​ ​the​ ​development​ ​of​ ​self-care​ ​(Davidson,​ ​2016, 
p. ​ ​1094).​ ​Davidson​ ​acknowledges​ ​the​ ​important​ ​changes ​ ​in​ ​government​ ​policy,​ ​such​ ​as​ ​the 
Americans​ ​with​ ​Disabilities​ ​Act ​ ​(ADA),​ ​as​ ​a​ ​positive​ ​step ​ ​toward​ ​empowerment​ ​and 
self-determination ​ ​for​ ​people​ ​with​ ​mental​ ​illness.​ ​However,​ ​he​ ​contends​ ​that​ ​policy​ ​must​ ​be 
converted​ ​into ​ ​action,​ ​which​ ​includes​ ​reducing​ ​stigma​ ​and​ ​discrimination,​ ​and​ ​implementing 
paid ​ ​peer​ ​supports​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​other​ ​Medicaid​ ​supports​ ​to​ ​provide​ ​housing​ ​and​ ​training​ ​in 
self-care​ ​for​ ​people​ ​with ​ ​mental ​ ​illness.​ ​Davidson​ ​especially​ ​values​ ​attending​ ​to​ ​the​ ​choices 
and​ ​expertise​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with​ ​mental​ ​illness ​ ​and​ ​their​ ​family​ ​members:​ ​“While​ ​stigma​ ​and 
discrimination ​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​pose​ ​formidable​ ​obstacles,​ ​the​ ​foundations​ ​have​ ​been​ ​laid​ ​for 
mental​ ​health​ ​practice​ ​to​ ​come​ ​closer​ ​to​ ​resembling​ ​health​ ​care​ ​for​ ​other​ ​medical​ ​conditions” 
(p.​ ​1091).​ ​Importantly,​ ​community​ ​inclusion​ ​should​ ​not​ ​be​ ​contingent​ ​upon​ ​recovery,​ ​but 
should​ ​be​ ​seen​ ​as​ ​a​ ​process​ ​that ​ ​contributes​ ​to​ ​recovery​ ​(Davidson,​ ​2016,​ ​p.​ ​1092).​ ​Davidson 
cites​ ​various​ ​“recovery”​ ​supports​ ​prompted​ ​by​ ​the​ ​community​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​acts​ ​of​ ​the​ ​1970's 
that​ ​include ​ ​“supported​ ​housing​ ​and​ ​supported ​ ​employment,​ ​along​ ​with​ ​the​ ​provision​ ​of 
community ​ ​supports​ ​in ​ ​such​ ​domains​ ​as​ ​education,​ ​parenting,​ ​socialization,​ ​and ​ ​spirituality” 
(p.​ ​1093). 
Mancini​ ​(2008),​ ​too,​ ​argues​ ​that​ ​self-determination ​ ​is​ ​the​ ​key​ ​component​ ​of​ ​any 
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Ryan ​ ​and ​ ​Deci ​ ​(2000),​ ​he​ ​articulates​ ​the​ ​basic​ ​characteristics ​ ​of 
self-determination—autonomy,​ ​competence​ ​and​ ​relatedness​ ​to​ ​others—arguing​ ​that​ ​autonomy 
is​ ​the​ ​most​ ​crucial ​ ​component ​ ​of​ ​recovery.​ ​“Although​ ​each​ ​need​ ​is​ ​important,​ ​I​ ​would​ ​suggest 
that​ ​instilling​ ​a​ ​sense​ ​of​ ​autonomy​ ​is​ ​the​ ​sine​ ​qua​ ​non​ ​of​ ​recovery-oriented ​ ​practice” 
(Mancini,​ ​2008,​ ​p.​ ​359).​ ​Mancini ​ ​describes​ ​current​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​practice​ ​as 
“traditional/paternalistic,”​ ​typically​ ​focusing​ ​on​ ​the​ ​rewards​ ​of​ ​adherence​ ​to​ ​a​ ​medication 
regimen​ ​and​ ​limiting​ ​choice​ ​for​ ​consumers​ ​to ​ ​which​ ​medications ​ ​will​ ​be​ ​used,​ ​not​ ​whether​ ​to 
take ​ ​medication ​ ​at​ ​all.​ ​Such​ ​care​ ​programs ​ ​focus​ ​on​ ​“stabilization”​ ​“i.e.​ ​reduction​ ​in 
symptoms,​ ​absence​ ​of​ ​relapse”​ ​(Mancini,​ ​2008,​ ​p.​ ​362),​ ​as ​ ​opposed ​ ​to​ ​full​ ​integration​ ​in​ ​the 
community ​ ​and​ ​the​ ​pursuit​ ​of​ ​a​ ​meaningful​ ​life​ ​aligned​ ​with​ ​the​ ​individual’s​ ​personal​ ​goals. 
Davidson​ ​(2016)​ ​likewise​ ​argues ​ ​that​ ​the​ ​key​ ​difference​ ​in​ ​more​ ​recent​ ​manifestations 
of​ ​the​ ​recovery​ ​model ​ ​is​ ​that,​ ​“Instead​ ​of​ ​being​ ​prescribed​ ​as​ ​an​ ​intervention​ ​to​ ​‘stabilize’​ ​a 
patient​ ​in​ ​the​ ​community,​ ​supports​ ​are​ ​provided​ ​to​ ​enable​ ​the​ ​person​ ​to​ ​participate​ ​as​ ​fully​ ​as 
possible​ ​in​ ​a​ ​life​ ​of​ ​his​ ​or​ ​her​ ​choosing”​ ​(p.​ ​1093).​ ​According​ ​to​ ​Davidson,​ ​care​ ​for​ ​people 
with​ ​psychiatric​ ​disabilities​ ​is​ ​a​ ​process ​ ​of​ ​engagement​ ​with​ ​the​ ​person,​ ​their​ ​family​ ​members 
and​ ​others​ ​that​ ​will ​ ​inevitably​ ​be​ ​a​ ​part​ ​of​ ​community​ ​integration: 
“Recovery-oriented​ ​clinical ​ ​practice​ ​should​ ​engage​ ​people​ ​with ​ ​mental​ ​illnesses,​ ​their 
loved​ ​ones,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​others​ ​who​ ​support​ ​them​ ​(such​ ​as​ ​their​ ​employers​ ​and​ ​landlords) 
in​ ​planning​ ​and​ ​evaluating​ ​care.​ ​It​ ​also​ ​involves​ ​identifying​ ​and​ ​building​ ​on​ ​people’s 
strengths​ ​and​ ​the​ ​opportunities​ ​and​ ​resources​ ​that​ ​exist​ ​in​ ​their​ ​communities,​ ​and 
equipping​ ​and​ ​empowering​ ​people​ ​to​ ​play​ ​an​ ​active​ ​role​ ​in​ ​the​ ​management​ ​of​ ​their 
conditions”​ ​(Davidson,​ ​2016,​ ​p.​ ​1097). 
However,​ ​as​ ​Corrigan ​ ​et​ ​al.​ ​(2012)​ ​caution,​ ​current​ ​psychiatric​ ​practice​ ​relies ​ ​on 
patient​ ​adherence​ ​to​ ​evidence-based​ ​practices,​ ​“including​ ​medication​ ​management,​ ​assertive 
community ​ ​treatment,​ ​supported ​ ​employment,​ ​family​ ​education​ ​and​ ​support,​ ​illness 
management​ ​and​ ​recovery,​ ​and​ ​integrated ​ ​co-occurring​ ​disorders ​ ​treatment”​ ​(p.​ ​170).​ ​When 
people​ ​diagnosed ​ ​with ​ ​mental​ ​illness​ ​do​ ​not​ ​comply​ ​with ​ ​the​ ​recommended​ ​treatment 
regimen,​ ​they​ ​are​ ​considered​ ​flawed​ ​and​ ​unable​ ​to​ ​follow ​ ​a​ ​program​ ​that​ ​will​ ​be​ ​beneficial​ ​to 
their​ ​health​ ​and​ ​well-being​ ​(Corrigan​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2012,​ ​p.​ ​169).​ ​Self-determination—defined ​ ​by​ ​the 
authors​ ​as​ ​the​ ​ability​ ​to​ ​make​ ​choices,​ ​especially​ ​in​ ​regard​ ​to​ ​housing,​ ​employment,​ ​personal 
relationships, ​ ​as​ ​well ​ ​as​ ​“spiritual,​ ​educational,​ ​and​ ​recreational​ ​goals”​ ​(p.​ ​170)—​ ​should​ ​be 
the​ ​new​ ​paradigm​ ​for​ ​treatment ​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with​ ​severe​ ​mental​ ​illness.​ ​People​ ​with​ ​severe 
mental​ ​illness​ ​also​ ​have​ ​the ​ ​right ​ ​to​ ​make​ ​choices​ ​that​ ​may​ ​not​ ​benefit​ ​their​ ​health​ ​and 
well-being.​ ​“People​ ​with​ ​serious​ ​mental​ ​illness,​ ​like​ ​everyone​ ​else,​ ​should​ ​have​ ​the​ ​dignity​ ​to 
fail—that​ ​is,​ ​to ​ ​make​ ​choices​ ​that ​ ​ultimately​ ​are​ ​the​ ​wrong​ ​choices”​ ​(Corrigan​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2012,​ ​p. 
170).​ ​The​ ​authors​ ​stress​ ​that ​ ​it ​ ​is​ ​important​ ​for​ ​mental​ ​health ​ ​practitioners​ ​to ​ ​value​ ​the​ ​goals 
of​ ​individuals​ ​with​ ​severe​ ​mental​ ​illness,​ ​even​ ​if​ ​these​ ​goals​ ​do​ ​not​ ​include​ ​symptom 
remission,​ ​“For​ ​example,​ ​having​ ​fewer ​ ​symptoms​ ​of​ ​depression​ ​is ​ ​a​ ​priority​ ​for​ ​one​ ​person, 
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172). 
A​ ​number​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with​ ​lived ​ ​experience​ ​of​ ​mental​ ​distress ​ ​echo​ ​these​ ​theorists,​ ​and 
cite​ ​self-determination ​ ​as​ ​a​ ​key​ ​component​ ​of​ ​their​ ​recovery.​ ​Cynthia​ ​Ann​ ​Piltch​ ​(2016),​ ​for 
example,​ ​utilizes​ ​her​ ​own​ ​experience​ ​of​ ​severe​ ​depression​ ​and​ ​hospitalization​ ​to​ ​argue​ ​that 
self-determination ​ ​is​ ​crucial​ ​to​ ​the​ ​recovery​ ​process.​ ​For​ ​Piltch,​ ​this ​ ​includes​ ​access​ ​to 
information​ ​about ​ ​treatment ​ ​options​ ​and​ ​other​ ​resources,​ ​exposure​ ​to​ ​mentors​ ​who​ ​have​ ​lived 
experience​ ​of​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​challenges,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as ​ ​the​ ​opportunity​ ​to​ ​be​ ​engaged​ ​in 
meaningful​ ​activities: 
“Mental​ ​health​ ​challenges​ ​are​ ​an​ ​assault​ ​on​ ​one’s​ ​self-esteem​ ​and ​ ​self-confidence.​ ​I 
believe​ ​that ​ ​these​ ​can​ ​be​ ​restored​ ​through ​ ​the​ ​growth​ ​of​ ​one’s ​ ​self-determination. 
Attention​ ​to​ ​these​ ​factors​ ​by​ ​service​ ​users ​ ​such ​ ​as​ ​myself,​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​the​ ​clinicians, 
peers,​ ​teachers,​ ​and ​ ​loved​ ​ones​ ​in​ ​our​ ​lives​ ​can​ ​play​ ​an​ ​invaluable​ ​role​ ​in​ ​supporting 
our​ ​recovery​ ​and​ ​cultivating​ ​our​ ​self-determination”​ ​(Piltch,​ ​2016,​ ​p.​ ​79). 
Jennifer​ ​Gerlach​ ​(2013)​ ​also ​ ​draws​ ​on​ ​her​ ​experience​ ​of​ ​continued​ ​mental​ ​distress​ ​to 
discuss​ ​the​ ​loss​ ​of​ ​control ​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of ​ ​her​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​conditions,​ ​but,​ ​more​ ​importantly, 
as​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of​ ​her​ ​treatment​ ​in​ ​psychiatric​ ​hospitals.​ ​“The​ ​individual's​ ​specific​ ​voice​ ​may​ ​go 
unheard, ​ ​both​ ​literally​ ​and​ ​metaphorically.​ ​Further​ ​what​ ​a​ ​person​ ​has​ ​to​ ​say​ ​may​ ​be​ ​chalked 
up ​ ​to​ ​their​ ​‘issues’​ ​or​ ​automatically​ ​deemed​ ​irrational​ ​or​ ​unreasonable.​ ​This​ ​can​ ​be​ ​incredibly 
disempowering”​ ​(p.​ ​203).​ ​She ​ ​asserts​ ​that​ ​it​ ​is​ ​only​ ​when ​ ​she​ ​was​ ​able​ ​to​ ​gain​ ​a​ ​measure​ ​of 
control​ ​over​ ​her​ ​own​ ​treatment ​ ​that ​ ​she​ ​was​ ​able​ ​to​ ​experience​ ​the​ ​benefits​ ​of​ ​recovery,​ ​which 
she​ ​defines​ ​as,​ ​“An​ ​active​ ​process,​ ​emphasizing​ ​full​ ​integration​ ​into​ ​society ​ ​at​ ​large”​ ​(2013,​ ​p. 
204).​ ​As​ ​a​ ​result ​ ​of​ ​various​ ​support ​ ​groups​ ​and​ ​a​ ​camp​ ​for​ ​youth ​ ​living​ ​with​ ​Tourette 
syndrome, ​ ​Gerlach​ ​found ​ ​she​ ​was​ ​able​ ​to​ ​see​ ​herself​ ​“not​ ​as​ ​a​ ​person​ ​who ​ ​had​ ​been ​ ​overcome 
by ​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​conditions,​ ​but ​ ​rather​ ​as​ ​someone​ ​who​ ​had​ ​these​ ​differences ​ ​but​ ​could​ ​still 
flourish​ ​and​ ​even​ ​use​ ​these​ ​experiences​ ​to​ ​help ​ ​others”​ ​(p.​ ​206).​ ​For​ ​Gerlach,​ ​like​ ​Piltch, 
self-determination ​ ​is​ ​key. 
While​ ​self-determination​ ​may​ ​be​ ​important​ ​for​ ​any​ ​individual,​ ​and​ ​while​ ​I​ ​do​ ​not​ ​wish 
to​ ​devalue​ ​the​ ​insights​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with​ ​psychiatric​ ​disabilities ​ ​who​ ​cite​ ​self-determination​ ​as​ ​a 
key​ ​aspect​ ​of​ ​their​ ​recovery​ ​processes,​ ​I​ ​contend​ ​we​ ​cannot​ ​advocate​ ​for​ ​self-determination 
without​ ​placing​ ​it​ ​in​ ​the​ ​broader​ ​materialist​ ​context​ ​of​ ​capitalist​ ​production.​ ​Transnational 
capitalism,​ ​as​ ​Erevelles​ ​(2011b)​ ​illustrates,​ ​produces​ ​social​ ​difference​ ​through​ ​specific 
ideologies​ ​and ​ ​relations​ ​of​ ​consumption ​ ​and​ ​production.​ ​Self-determination​ ​frameworks ​ ​do 
not​ ​adequately​ ​address​ ​the​ ​material​ ​oppressions​ ​of​ ​racism,​ ​sexism​ ​and​ ​poverty​ ​enforced ​ ​by 
capitalist​ ​production,​ ​oppressions​ ​which​ ​also​ ​contribute​ ​to​ ​a​ ​person’s​ ​mental​ ​distress.  
The​ ​concept ​ ​of​ ​recovery​ ​is​ ​a​ ​contested​ ​issue​ ​for​ ​many​ ​people​ ​who​ ​identify​ ​as​ ​mad 
activists​ ​and​ ​scholars.​ ​A​ ​number​ ​of​ ​people​ ​in​ ​this​ ​movement​ ​do​ ​not​ ​have​ ​the​ ​desire​ ​to​ ​recover 
a​ ​“meaningful​ ​life” ​ ​in​ ​a​ ​mainstream​ ​community​ ​plagued ​ ​by​ ​the​ ​oppressions ​ ​of​ ​racism, 
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would ​ ​not​ ​advocate​ ​with​ ​Davidson​ ​(2016)​ ​for​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​treatment​ ​to​ ​adopt​ ​the​ ​practices 
of​ ​other​ ​medical ​ ​conditions.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​a​ ​medicalizing​ ​view​ ​that​ ​pathologizes​ ​people​ ​who 
experience​ ​mental​ ​distress,​ ​and​ ​still ​ ​suggests​ ​there​ ​is ​ ​an​ ​inherent​ ​flaw​ ​in​ ​the​ ​way​ ​people​ ​with 
psychiatric​ ​disabilities​ ​navigate​ ​their​ ​experience​ ​(Beresford,​ ​2016).​ ​While​ ​I​ ​admit​ ​that​ ​in 
many​ ​ways​ ​I​ ​am​ ​an​ ​example​ ​of​ ​recovery​ ​from​ ​severe​ ​mental​ ​illness,​ ​my​ ​own​ ​experience​ ​with 
self-determination ​ ​is​ ​much​ ​more​ ​complex. 
My​ ​Complex​ ​Relationship​ ​to​ ​Self-Determination 
As​ ​a​ ​woman​ ​with​ ​bipolar​ ​disorder,​ ​I​ ​have​ ​made​ ​it​ ​a​ ​priority​ ​to​ ​attend​ ​to​ ​my​ ​mental 
health​ ​on ​ ​a​ ​daily​ ​basis.​ ​I​ ​adhere​ ​to​ ​a​ ​medication​ ​regimen​ ​that​ ​includes ​ ​an​ ​antipsychotic,​ ​an 
antidepressant​ ​and ​ ​anti-anxiety​ ​medication ​ ​to​ ​help​ ​with​ ​sleep.​ ​I​ ​attend​ ​weekly​ ​individual​ ​and 
group​ ​therapy,​ ​moderate​ ​my​ ​drinking​ ​and​ ​try​ ​to​ ​exercise​ ​at​ ​least​ ​three​ ​times​ ​a​ ​week.​ ​As​ ​a 
result​ ​of​ ​these​ ​efforts,​ ​I​ ​function​ ​quite​ ​well​ ​and​ ​could​ ​easily ​ ​be​ ​considered​ ​a​ ​“poster​ ​child”​ ​for 
recovery.​ ​I​ ​am​ ​currently​ ​a​ ​PhD​ ​candidate​ ​in​ ​Disability​ ​Studies,​ ​and​ ​live​ ​on​ ​my​ ​own ​ ​in 
Chicago,​ ​Illinois.​ ​I​ ​did ​ ​not​ ​always​ ​function​ ​this​ ​well.​ ​I​ ​have​ ​been​ ​hospitalized​ ​for​ ​bipolar 
psychosis​ ​and ​ ​have​ ​experienced ​ ​two​ ​full-blown​ ​manic​ ​episodes​ ​that​ ​required​ ​I​ ​withdraw​ ​from 
my ​ ​undergraduate​ ​program.​ ​A​ ​severe​ ​depressive​ ​episode​ ​later​ ​resulted​ ​in​ ​having​ ​to​ ​quit​ ​my 
job ​ ​as​ ​a​ ​high​ ​school​ ​teacher​ ​mid-semester.​ ​Working​ ​to​ ​rebuild​ ​my​ ​life​ ​following​ ​these 
episodes,​ ​with​ ​the​ ​strong​ ​support ​ ​of​ ​my​ ​immediate​ ​family​ ​and ​ ​their​ ​resources,​ ​is ​ ​not​ ​a​ ​new 
experience​ ​for​ ​me.​ ​I​ ​was​ ​lucky​ ​to​ ​receive​ ​excellent​ ​psychiatric​ ​care​ ​and​ ​benefit​ ​from 
improvements​ ​in ​ ​anti-psychotic​ ​medications—namely​ ​increasingly​ ​less​ ​sedating ​ ​side 
effects—which​ ​has​ ​allowed​ ​me​ ​to ​ ​live​ ​my​ ​life​ ​as​ ​I​ ​choose,​ ​some​ ​would​ ​even​ ​say​ ​flourish. 
While​ ​I​ ​acknowledge​ ​that​ ​self-determination​ ​is​ ​a​ ​strong​ ​component​ ​of​ ​my ​ ​recovery, 
my ​ ​positionality​ ​as​ ​a​ ​white,​ ​heterosexual​ ​woman​ ​from​ ​an​ ​upper-middle​ ​class,​ ​two​ ​parent 
household​ ​has​ ​been​ ​an ​ ​even​ ​stronger​ ​component.​ ​My​ ​positionality ​ ​has​ ​meant​ ​access​ ​to 
resources,​ ​including​ ​financial,​ ​but​ ​also​ ​flexibility​ ​in​ ​terms ​ ​of​ ​time,​ ​should​ ​I​ ​require​ ​extra​ ​care. 
Disparities​ ​in ​ ​diagnosis​ ​and ​ ​treatment​ ​outcomes ​ ​based​ ​on​ ​race,​ ​gender​ ​and​ ​socioeconomic 
status​ ​have​ ​received​ ​increasingly​ ​more​ ​attention​ ​in​ ​the​ ​past​ ​few​ ​decades,​ ​in​ ​particular​ ​for 
people​ ​living​ ​in​ ​rural​ ​areas​ ​or​ ​experiencing​ ​poverty:​ ​“…Many​ ​rural​ ​Americans​ ​have​ ​less 
access​ ​to​ ​mental ​ ​health​ ​services​ ​than​ ​do​ ​other​ ​Americans,​ ​suicide​ ​rates ​ ​vary​ ​with​ ​respect​ ​to​ ​a 
variety ​ ​of​ ​demographic​ ​variables,​ ​and​ ​persons​ ​with​ ​the​ ​lowest​ ​level​ ​of​ ​socioeconomic​ ​status 
are​ ​estimated​ ​to​ ​be ​ ​about ​ ​2​ ​to ​ ​3​ ​times​ ​more​ ​likely​ ​to​ ​have​ ​a​ ​mental​ ​disorder​ ​than ​ ​are​ ​those 
with​ ​the​ ​highest​ ​level ​ ​of​ ​such​ ​status”​ ​(Safran​ ​et​ ​al.,​ ​2009,​ ​p.​ ​1962).​ ​Structural​ ​disparities​ ​in 
materiality​ ​matter​ ​to ​ ​mental​ ​health. 
Still,​ ​despite ​ ​my​ ​current​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​my​ ​own​ ​care​ ​and​ ​functioning,​ ​there​ ​are​ ​days 
when ​ ​I​ ​simply​ ​can’t ​ ​get ​ ​out​ ​of​ ​bed,​ ​or​ ​when​ ​I​ ​have​ ​to​ ​focus ​ ​on​ ​calming​ ​my​ ​racing​ ​thoughts 
and​ ​increased​ ​energy​ ​levels​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​structuring​ ​my​ ​day​ ​as​ ​I​ ​choose.​ ​When​ ​I​ ​am​ ​depressed, 
decision​ ​making​ ​becomes​ ​impossible,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​impulsiveness​ ​that​ ​characterizes ​ ​my​ ​manic 
episodes​ ​must​ ​be​ ​acknowledged​ ​and​ ​managed,​ ​so​ ​I​ ​am​ ​hesitant​ ​to​ ​make​ ​any​ ​decisions​ ​during 
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or​ ​even​ ​years,​ ​but ​ ​on​ ​these​ ​days, ​ ​it ​ ​is​ ​not​ ​self-determination​ ​that​ ​keeps​ ​me​ ​going.​ ​I​ ​have​ ​a 
strong,​ ​supportive​ ​disability​ ​community​ ​in ​ ​Chicago,​ ​and​ ​I​ ​have​ ​told ​ ​my​ ​friends​ ​in​ ​this 
community ​ ​that​ ​during​ ​these​ ​times,​ ​when​ ​attending​ ​to​ ​my​ ​basic​ ​care​ ​needs​ ​seems​ ​impossible, 
what​ ​I​ ​really​ ​need​ ​is​ ​someone​ ​to​ ​bring ​ ​me​ ​dinner,​ ​or​ ​walk​ ​with​ ​me​ ​to​ ​get​ ​food.​ ​Any​ ​food 
preparation,​ ​much​ ​less​ ​clean​ ​up,​ ​is​ ​an​ ​overwhelming​ ​task.​ ​The​ ​fact​ ​that​ ​I​ ​cannot​ ​prepare​ ​a 
meal​ ​or​ ​wash ​ ​my​ ​pile​ ​of​ ​dishes​ ​makes​ ​me​ ​feel​ ​even​ ​more​ ​overwhelmed​ ​and​ ​dejected;​ ​the 
basic ​ ​care​ ​my​ ​friends​ ​provide​ ​of​ ​bringing​ ​me​ ​food​ ​and​ ​offering​ ​to​ ​clean​ ​up​ ​my​ ​apartment​ ​a​ ​bit 
is​ ​immensely​ ​helpful. 
Neoliberal ​ ​ideologies,​ ​policies​ ​and​ ​governance​ ​structure​ ​in​ ​the​ ​global​ ​north​ ​include​ ​the 
marketization​ ​and ​ ​responsibilization​ ​of​ ​all​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​life​ ​while​ ​concealing​ ​how ​ ​capitalist 
production ​ ​and​ ​consumption​ ​demands​ ​productivity​ ​at​ ​all​ ​times ​ ​(Larner,​ ​2000).​ ​Many ​ ​scholars 
who​ ​discuss​ ​neoliberalism​ ​also​ ​emphasize​ ​the​ ​concepts​ ​of​ ​choice​ ​and​ ​personal​ ​responsibility 
inherent​ ​in​ ​the​ ​framework.​ ​Neoliberal​ ​models​ ​of​ ​choice,​ ​create​ ​a​ ​regime​ ​of​ ​violence​ ​that​ ​is​ ​not 
necessarily ​ ​coercive​ ​but​ ​instead​ ​appears​ ​as ​ ​if​ ​we​ ​‘can​ ​be​ ​all​ ​we​ ​want​ ​to​ ​be’​ ​and​ ​in ​ ​fact​ ​should 
aspire​ ​to ​ ​do​ ​so,​ ​without ​ ​taking​ ​into ​ ​account​ ​the​ ​restrictions​ ​put​ ​forth​ ​by​ ​oppression​ ​due​ ​to 
racism,​ ​class​ ​inequality,​ ​gender/sexuality​ ​and​ ​mental​ ​difference​ ​(O’Leary​ ​&​ ​Ben-Moshe, 
forthcoming). 
As​ ​such,​ ​it​ ​is​ ​during​ ​the​ ​episodes​ ​I​ ​describe​ ​above​ ​that​ ​I​ ​embody​ ​Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson’s​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​“misfitting.”​ ​Garland-Thomson​ ​(2011)​ ​explains​ ​that​ ​the​ ​misfit 
is​ ​a​ ​mismatch​ ​between​ ​embodiment​ ​and​ ​environment.​ ​The​ ​concept​ ​of​ ​misfitting​ ​firmly​ ​lodges 
oppression​ ​in​ ​material​ ​conditions​ ​“rather​ ​than​ ​social​ ​attitudes ​ ​or​ ​representational​ ​practices” 
(p.​ ​593).​ ​Fitting​ ​is​ ​a​ ​phenomenology​ ​of​ ​privilege​ ​that​ ​confers​ ​social​ ​capital​ ​and​ ​allows​ ​one​ ​to 
“exercise​ ​the​ ​rights​ ​of​ ​citizenship ​ ​in​ ​democratic​ ​orders”​ ​(p.​ ​596). 
Even​ ​when​ ​I​ ​am​ ​not ​ ​necessarily​ ​symptomatic,​ ​I​ ​identify​ ​as​ ​bipolar,​ ​disabled​ ​or​ ​mad, 
depending​ ​on​ ​the​ ​context,​ ​and​ ​I​ ​acknowledge​ ​that​ ​this ​ ​identity​ ​is ​ ​a​ ​crucial​ ​part​ ​of​ ​how​ ​I 
navigate​ ​the​ ​world​ ​and​ ​build​ ​relationships​ ​with​ ​others.​ ​My​ ​disability​ ​identity​ ​is​ ​not​ ​just​ ​a 
small​ ​part​ ​of​ ​who ​ ​I​ ​am,​ ​but​ ​in​ ​many​ ​ways,​ ​defines​ ​me,​ ​the​ ​choices​ ​I​ ​make,​ ​the​ ​relationships​ ​I 
choose​ ​to ​ ​build,​ ​as​ ​well ​ ​as​ ​the​ ​scholarship,​ ​activism​ ​and​ ​advocacy​ ​I​ ​choose​ ​to​ ​engage​ ​with.​ ​As 
a​ ​result​ ​of​ ​my​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability,​ ​or​ ​madness,​ ​I​ ​do​ ​not​ ​always​ ​possess​ ​the​ ​phenomenology 
of​ ​privilege​ ​that​ ​fitting​ ​confers.​ ​This​ ​experience​ ​of​ ​misfitting​ ​is​ ​not​ ​static​ ​for​ ​me​ ​and,​ ​in​ ​some 
contexts,​ ​I​ ​do​ ​fit ​ ​quite​ ​well.​ ​Still,​ ​my​ ​experience​ ​of​ ​misfitting​ ​in​ ​certain​ ​contexts​ ​affects​ ​my 
social​ ​capital​ ​and ​ ​status​ ​on​ ​the​ ​hierarchy​ ​of​ ​production​ ​and​ ​efficiency​ ​dictated​ ​by​ ​the 
capitalist​ ​structures​ ​of​ ​our​ ​society.​ ​The​ ​life​ ​of​ ​a​ ​PhD​ ​student​ ​allows ​ ​flexibility,​ ​but​ ​most​ ​jobs 
in​ ​the​ ​marketplace​ ​that ​ ​provide​ ​a​ ​stable​ ​income​ ​and​ ​insurance​ ​do​ ​not.​ ​I​ ​went​ ​into​ ​teaching​ ​for 
the​ ​promises​ ​of​ ​stability​ ​and​ ​excellent​ ​insurance​ ​that​ ​would​ ​cover​ ​my​ ​psychiatric 
appointments​ ​and​ ​expensive​ ​medications.​ ​However,​ ​my​ ​bodymind​ ​was​ ​not​ ​equipped ​ ​to​ ​be 
fully​ ​functioning ​ ​from​ ​8am​ ​to​ ​5pm,​ ​five​ ​days​ ​a​ ​week​ ​for​ ​an​ ​entire​ ​school​ ​year,​ ​even​ ​with​ ​the 
promise​ ​of​ ​a​ ​summer​ ​vacation.​ ​In​ ​that​ ​sense,​ ​my​ ​choices​ ​for​ ​employment​ ​are​ ​limited.​ ​I​ ​opted 
for​ ​the​ ​flexibility​ ​of​ ​academia,​ ​which​ ​is​ ​working ​ ​out​ ​well​ ​thus ​ ​far.​ ​Academia​ ​remains ​ ​a 
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(Rodríguez,​ ​2012,​ ​p.​ ​810).​ ​Tenure​ ​track​ ​academic​ ​jobs​ ​demand​ ​a​ ​high​ ​amount​ ​of​ ​productivity, 
but​ ​also​ ​entail​ ​“surveillance, ​ ​discipline​ ​and​ ​low​ ​wage​ ​punishment”​ ​for​ ​those​ ​in​ ​more 
marginalized​ ​positions​ ​(Rodriguez,​ ​2012,​ ​p.​ ​811).​ ​Still,​ ​while​ ​the​ ​flexibility​ ​of​ ​scheduling 
does​ ​require​ ​intensive​ ​time​ ​management​ ​skills,​ ​it​ ​also​ ​does​ ​not​ ​necessarily​ ​require​ ​that​ ​I​ ​be 
fully​ ​functional​ ​for​ ​up​ ​to​ ​10​ ​hours​ ​a​ ​day,​ ​five​ ​days​ ​out​ ​of​ ​the​ ​week.​ ​In ​ ​important​ ​ways ​ ​I​ ​can 
structure​ ​my​ ​days​ ​according​ ​to​ ​my​ ​own​ ​choice,​ ​and​ ​if​ ​I​ ​am​ ​not​ ​functional​ ​one​ ​day​ ​it​ ​generally 
does​ ​not​ ​require​ ​I​ ​call​ ​into​ ​work ​ ​and​ ​feign​ ​a​ ​migraine,​ ​only​ ​that​ ​I​ ​make​ ​up​ ​the​ ​work​ ​when​ ​I 
can.​ ​I​ ​also​ ​acknowledge​ ​that ​ ​my​ ​misfitting​ ​has​ ​been​ ​an​ ​important​ ​component​ ​in​ ​redefining 
how​ ​I​ ​view​ ​my ​ ​own​ ​agency.​ ​Garland-Thomson​ ​(2011)​ ​discusses​ ​the​ ​benefits ​ ​misfitting​ ​can 
confer​ ​in​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​identity​ ​formation​ ​and​ ​political​ ​activism,​ ​despite​ ​the​ ​obvious​ ​advantages 
of​ ​navigating​ ​our​ ​current ​ ​world​ ​with​ ​ease: 
“In​ ​this​ ​sense,​ ​the​ ​experience​ ​of​ ​misfitting​ ​can​ ​produce​ ​subjugated​ ​knowledges​ ​from 
which​ ​an​ ​oppositional ​ ​consciousness ​ ​and​ ​politicized​ ​identity​ ​might​ ​arise.​ ​So​ ​although 
misfitting​ ​can​ ​lead​ ​to​ ​segregation,​ ​exclusion​ ​from​ ​the​ ​rights​ ​of​ ​citizenship,​ ​and 
alienation ​ ​from​ ​a​ ​majority ​ ​community,​ ​it​ ​can​ ​also​ ​foster​ ​intense​ ​awareness ​ ​of​ ​social 
injustice​ ​and​ ​the​ ​formation​ ​of​ ​a​ ​community​ ​of​ ​misfits​ ​that​ ​can​ ​collaborate​ ​to ​ ​achieve​ ​a 
more​ ​liberatory ​ ​politics​ ​and​ ​praxis”​ ​(Garland-Thomson,​ ​2011,​ ​p.​ ​597). 
I​ ​love​ ​the ​ ​disability​ ​community​ ​I​ ​now ​ ​belong​ ​to,​ ​and​ ​I​ ​choose​ ​to​ ​spend​ ​my​ ​time 
engaged ​ ​with​ ​intense​ ​discussions​ ​of​ ​what​ ​it​ ​means ​ ​not​ ​to ​ ​fit.​ ​When​ ​I​ ​presented​ ​at​ ​the​ ​Mad 
Studies​ ​stream​ ​of​ ​the​ ​Lancaster​ ​Disability​ ​Studies​ ​Conference​ ​in​ ​England,​ ​I​ ​left​ ​feeling​ ​an 
exhilaration​ ​and​ ​energy​ ​that ​ ​only​ ​comes ​ ​from​ ​engagement​ ​with​ ​a​ ​community​ ​of​ ​people​ ​who 
experience​ ​misfitting​ ​in​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​same​ ​ways​ ​I​ ​do​ ​and,​ ​thus,​ ​share​ ​many ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​same​ ​sorts 
of​ ​subjugated​ ​knowledges,​ ​in​ ​this​ ​case​ ​the​ ​crazies​ ​and​ ​mad.​ ​Being​ ​part​ ​of​ ​the​ ​knowledge​ ​and 
praxis​ ​that​ ​such​ ​a ​ ​community​ ​generates​ ​is​ ​intensely​ ​valuable​ ​to​ ​me​ ​and​ ​is​ ​something​ ​that​ ​I 
know​ ​many​ ​people​ ​in​ ​my​ ​life​ ​will​ ​never​ ​experience,​ ​namely​ ​my​ ​immediate​ ​family,​ ​my 
parents​ ​and ​ ​my​ ​sister.​ ​While ​ ​I​ ​love​ ​them​ ​dearly​ ​and​ ​am​ ​so​ ​grateful​ ​for​ ​the​ ​endless​ ​love​ ​and 
support​ ​they​ ​have​ ​given ​ ​me,​ ​they​ ​admit​ ​that​ ​their​ ​bodyminds​ ​do​ ​represent​ ​the​ ​norm,​ ​and,​ ​in 
many​ ​ways​ ​this​ ​has​ ​made ​ ​life ​ ​much ​ ​easier​ ​for​ ​them.​ ​This​ ​is​ ​something​ ​I​ ​will​ ​never 
understand,​ ​or​ ​embody,​ ​and​ ​I​ ​find​ ​myself​ ​grateful​ ​for​ ​that​ ​as​ ​well. 
Self-determination​ ​and​ ​recovery​ ​dictate​ ​that​ ​I​ ​should​ ​choose​ ​to​ ​engage​ ​with ​ ​society​ ​in 
“meaningful”​ ​ways.​ ​But ​ ​what​ ​currently​ ​gives ​ ​my​ ​life​ ​meaning​ ​is​ ​to​ ​take​ ​part​ ​in​ ​a​ ​community 
of​ ​resistance​ ​against ​ ​the ​ ​heterosexist,​ ​racist,​ ​ableist​ ​and​ ​sanist​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​that​ ​I​ ​wish 
to​ ​transform.​ ​I​ ​do​ ​not​ ​necessarily ​ ​live​ ​my​ ​life​ ​with​ ​ease,​ ​but​ ​I​ ​do​ ​live​ ​it​ ​with​ ​agency,​ ​and​ ​I 
think​ ​my ​ ​disability​ ​identity ​ ​is​ ​a​ ​key​ ​component​ ​of​ ​this. 
I​ ​also​ ​possess​ ​privilege​ ​that​ ​has​ ​allowed​ ​me​ ​to​ ​live​ ​my​ ​life​ ​with​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​form​ ​of 
agency​ ​emerging​ ​within​ ​global ​ ​north​ ​disability​ ​scholarship​ ​and​ ​community.​ ​My​ ​status​ ​as 
white,​ ​heterosexual ​ ​and​ ​middle-class​ ​also​ ​affords​ ​many​ ​opportunities​ ​to​ ​engage​ ​what​ ​is 
currently ​ ​framed​ ​as​ ​recovery.​ ​The ​ ​dominant​ ​pathways​ ​to​ ​self-determination ​ ​and​ ​recovery​ ​I 




 REVIEW​ ​OF​ ​DISABILITY​ ​STUDIES:​ ​AN​ ​INTERNATIONAL​ ​JOURNAL Volume​ ​13 ​ ​Issue​ ​4 
 
are​ ​marginalized​ ​within​ ​the​ ​intersectional​ ​oppressions ​ ​of​ ​race,​ ​gender​ ​and​ ​class​ ​status.​ ​Our 
society ​ ​is​ ​designed​ ​for​ ​certain​ ​people​ ​to​ ​be​ ​successful​ ​and​ ​this​ ​includes​ ​only​ ​a​ ​portion​ ​of​ ​those 
living ​ ​with ​ ​mental ​ ​health​ ​issues.​ ​Until​ ​systemic​ ​structures​ ​of​ ​oppression​ ​are​ ​transformed, 
self-determination ​ ​as​ ​a​ ​gateway​ ​to​ ​recovery​ ​will​ ​only​ ​benefit​ ​those​ ​who​ ​already​ ​possess​ ​social 
and​ ​economic​ ​capital​ ​in​ ​other​ ​aspects​ ​of​ ​their​ ​identity. 
​ ​My ​ ​aunt,​ ​my​ ​mother’s​ ​sister,​ ​is​ ​an​ ​extremely​ ​sensitive​ ​and​ ​amazing​ ​woman​ ​who​ ​has 
struggled​ ​with ​ ​various​ ​forms​ ​of​ ​mental​ ​distress​ ​her​ ​entire​ ​life.​ ​I​ ​tell​ ​her​ ​story​ ​here​ ​as​ ​someone 
known​ ​intimately​ ​and​ ​I​ ​feel​ ​that​ ​many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​opportunities​ ​for​ ​care​ ​that​ ​I​ ​am​ ​advocating ​ ​here 
would ​ ​benefit​ ​her​ ​immensely,​ ​as​ ​she​ ​is ​ ​often​ ​blamed​ ​for​ ​her​ ​own​ ​struggles​ ​and​ ​faulty​ ​choices. 
By​ ​telling​ ​her​ ​story​ ​I​ ​wish​ ​to​ ​reinforce​ ​my​ ​argument​ ​that​ ​neoliberal​ ​notions​ ​of​ ​productivity, 
choice​ ​and​ ​responsibility ​ ​are​ ​highly​ ​embedded​ ​in​ ​conceptions​ ​of​ ​self-determination.​ ​What 
often ​ ​gets​ ​ignored ​ ​are​ ​the ​ ​material ​ ​structures​ ​of​ ​poverty,​ ​racism​ ​and​ ​sexism​ ​that​ ​actually​ ​make 
self-determination ​ ​impossible​ ​for​ ​many.​ ​My​ ​aunt​ ​gets​ ​angry​ ​when​ ​anyone​ ​calls ​ ​her​ ​crazy,​ ​as 
she​ ​does​ ​not ​ ​see​ ​this​ ​as​ ​a​ ​potentially​ ​politicized​ ​identity,​ ​and​ ​to ​ ​be​ ​fair,​ ​most​ ​of​ ​the​ ​people​ ​in 
her​ ​life​ ​are​ ​utilizing​ ​the​ ​label​ ​in​ ​a​ ​negative​ ​and​ ​dismissive​ ​way.​ ​Still,​ ​my​ ​aunt’s​ ​mood​ ​swings, 
angry​ ​outbursts,​ ​regular​ ​tearful ​ ​episodes​ ​and​ ​days​ ​when​ ​she​ ​cannot​ ​get​ ​out​ ​of​ ​bed,​ ​have​ ​made 
pursuing​ ​the​ ​functions​ ​of​ ​daily​ ​living​ ​very​ ​difficult​ ​for​ ​her.​ ​She​ ​may​ ​not​ ​identify​ ​as​ ​crazy,​ ​but 
she​ ​does​ ​often​ ​embody​ ​Garland-Thomson’s​ ​definition​ ​of​ ​misfitting.​ ​The​ ​material​ ​conditions 
of​ ​the​ ​world​ ​in​ ​which​ ​she​ ​lives​ ​are ​ ​not​ ​often​ ​conducive​ ​to​ ​her​ ​highly​ ​sensitive​ ​nature.​ ​As​ ​a 
result,​ ​she​ ​struggles​ ​quite​ ​a​ ​bit. ​ ​She​ ​is​ ​a​ ​hairdresser​ ​living​ ​in ​ ​poverty ​ ​and​ ​a​ ​single​ ​mom.​ ​Her 
devotion ​ ​to​ ​her​ ​son​ ​is​ ​nothing​ ​short​ ​of​ ​remarkable,​ ​but​ ​she​ ​was​ ​tasked​ ​with​ ​raising​ ​him​ ​with 
very ​ ​limited​ ​resources,​ ​while ​ ​also​ ​contending​ ​with​ ​her​ ​own​ ​navigation​ ​of​ ​an​ ​inaccessible 
world.​ ​Sexism​ ​also​ ​figures​ ​strongly​ ​in​ ​her​ ​life.​ ​Her​ ​son’s ​ ​father​ ​provided​ ​some​ ​financial 
support,​ ​although​ ​this​ ​was​ ​not ​ ​always​ ​steady.​ ​He​ ​would​ ​show ​ ​up ​ ​on​ ​the​ ​weekends​ ​to​ ​take​ ​his 
son ​ ​fishing​ ​or​ ​camping,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​majority​ ​of​ ​the​ ​child-rearing​ ​fell​ ​to​ ​my​ ​aunt.​ ​Her​ ​options​ ​for 
respite,​ ​treatment ​ ​and​ ​support​ ​are​ ​limited.​ ​Her​ ​general​ ​practitioner,​ ​through​ ​Medicaid, 
prescribed​ ​a​ ​daily​ ​dosage​ ​of​ ​Prozac​ ​to ​ ​ease​ ​her​ ​struggles​ ​a​ ​bit.​ ​Prozac​ ​is​ ​a​ ​very​ ​old​ ​drug​ ​with 
many​ ​side ​ ​effects​ ​and​ ​while​ ​it ​ ​treated​ ​her​ ​low ​ ​moods​ ​and​ ​obsessive​ ​tendencies​ ​it​ ​also​ ​caused 
increased​ ​drowsiness​ ​and​ ​a​ ​propensity​ ​to​ ​let​ ​many​ ​things​ ​in​ ​her​ ​life​ ​slide,​ ​as​ ​she​ ​simply​ ​found 
herself​ ​not​ ​caring​ ​anymore. ​ ​She​ ​had ​ ​no​ ​additional​ ​supports​ ​in​ ​terms ​ ​of​ ​therapy​ ​to​ ​adjust​ ​to​ ​this 
change, ​ ​but​ ​was​ ​still ​ ​expected​ ​to ​ ​manage​ ​these​ ​issues​ ​on​ ​her​ ​own​ ​while​ ​attending​ ​to ​ ​the​ ​daily 
tasks​ ​of​ ​living,​ ​working​ ​and​ ​helping​ ​to​ ​support​ ​her​ ​son,​ ​who​ ​is​ ​now ​ ​21.​ ​My​ ​aunt​ ​went​ ​off​ ​the 
medication​ ​and​ ​continues​ ​to ​ ​regularly​ ​struggle.​ ​I​ ​do​ ​not​ ​blame​ ​her​ ​struggles ​ ​on ​ ​a​ ​lack​ ​of 
self-determination ​ ​or​ ​an​ ​inability​ ​to ​ ​take​ ​responsibility​ ​for​ ​her​ ​life,​ ​but​ ​on​ ​the​ ​structural 
conditions​ ​of​ ​poverty​ ​and​ ​sexism​ ​that​ ​make​ ​recovery ​ ​very​ ​difficult​ ​for​ ​her.​ ​Should​ ​she​ ​be 
provided​ ​with​ ​supports​ ​to​ ​ease​ ​the​ ​material​ ​conditions​ ​of​ ​poverty,​ ​I​ ​think​ ​she​ ​would​ ​have 
more ​ ​time​ ​and​ ​resources​ ​to​ ​attend​ ​to​ ​her​ ​own​ ​care​ ​needs,​ ​and​ ​find​ ​some​ ​ways​ ​to​ ​ease​ ​her 
anxiety​ ​and​ ​advocate​ ​for​ ​herself.​ ​This​ ​might​ ​include​ ​someone​ ​to​ ​clean​ ​her​ ​trailer,​ ​provide 
more ​ ​stable​ ​and ​ ​affordable​ ​housing,​ ​make​ ​her​ ​meals​ ​and​ ​offer​ ​assistance​ ​in​ ​raising​ ​her​ ​son.​ ​In 
advocating​ ​for​ ​self-determination ​ ​as​ ​the​ ​primary​ ​means ​ ​of​ ​recovery​ ​from​ ​mental​ ​distress,​ ​we 
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embrace​ ​self-determination.​ ​Self-determination​ ​as​ ​it​ ​is ​ ​currently​ ​framed​ ​without​ ​context, 
reifies​ ​class,​ ​gender​ ​and ​ ​racial ​ ​oppressions​ ​as​ ​individual​ ​matters,​ ​offering​ ​opportunities ​ ​only 
for​ ​those​ ​willing​ ​and​ ​able​ ​to​ ​take​ ​them. 
Many​ ​of​ ​the​ ​things​ ​I​ ​do​ ​to​ ​promote​ ​my​ ​self-care​ ​and​ ​ease​ ​my​ ​stress​ ​implicate​ ​me​ ​in​ ​a 
gendered ​ ​and​ ​racialized​ ​labor​ ​force.​ ​I​ ​hire​ ​people​ ​to​ ​clean​ ​my​ ​apartment​ ​once​ ​a​ ​month 
through​ ​a ​ ​company​ ​that​ ​charges​ ​a​ ​flat ​ ​fee​ ​for​ ​a​ ​two-hour​ ​cleaning.​ ​I​ ​have​ ​had​ ​a​ ​variety​ ​of 
people​ ​clean​ ​my​ ​apartment,​ ​all​ ​of​ ​them​ ​women​ ​of​ ​color.​ ​Duffy​ ​(2007)​ ​studied​ ​the 
demographics​ ​of​ ​an​ ​increasingly ​ ​racialized​ ​labor​ ​force​ ​that​ ​does​ ​the​ ​bulk​ ​of​ ​care​ ​involving 
cleaning​ ​and​ ​food ​ ​preparation,​ ​what ​ ​she​ ​describes ​ ​as​ ​“non-nurturant​ ​reproductive​ ​labor”​ ​(p. 
315).​ ​“In​ ​1900,​ ​all ​ ​groups​ ​of​ ​women​ ​were​ ​heavily​ ​overrepresented​ ​among​ ​non-nurturant 
labor.​ ​Black​ ​women’s​ ​enormously​ ​disproportionate​ ​representation​ ​among​ ​domestic​ ​workers​ ​is 
reflected​ ​in ​ ​a​ ​relative​ ​concentration​ ​of​ ​6.66​ ​in​ ​non-nurturant​ ​reproductive​ ​labor,”​ ​Duffy’s 
figures​ ​represent, ​ ​“the​ ​ratio​ ​of​ ​a​ ​group’s ​ ​representation​ ​in ​ ​a​ ​particular​ ​sector​ ​relative​ ​to ​ ​that 
group’s​ ​representation ​ ​in​ ​the​ ​labor​ ​market​ ​as​ ​a​ ​whole​ ​(Amott​ ​&​ ​Matthaei,​ ​as​ ​cited​ ​in​ ​Duffy, 
2007).​ ​A​ ​value ​ ​of​ ​1​ ​indicates​ ​perfectly​ ​proportional​ ​representation,​ ​values ​ ​more​ ​than​ ​1 
indicate​ ​overrepresentation​ ​and​ ​values​ ​less​ ​than​ ​1​ ​indicate​ ​under​ ​representation”​ ​(Duffy, 
2007,​ ​p.​ ​329). ​ ​She​ ​notes​ ​the​ ​shifts​ ​in​ ​these​ ​demographics​ ​as​ ​of​ ​the​ ​year​ ​2000,​ ​with​ ​the 
concentration​ ​of​ ​white​ ​women ​ ​in​ ​these​ ​positions​ ​decreasing​ ​to​ ​1.04,​ ​a​ ​nearly​ ​proportional 
representation​ ​compared​ ​to​ ​their​ ​representation​ ​in​ ​the​ ​labor​ ​market​ ​as​ ​a​ ​whole.​ ​The 
concentration​ ​of​ ​Hispanic​ ​women​ ​rose​ ​to​ ​2.00,​ ​while,​ ​Black​ ​women​ ​and ​ ​Asian/Pacific​ ​women 
remain ​ ​overrepresented ​ ​in​ ​these​ ​sectors​ ​with​ ​respective​ ​rates​ ​of​ ​1.41​ ​and​ ​1.28​ ​(p.​ ​330).​ ​These 
women’s​ ​situations​ ​illustrate​ ​that ​ ​the​ ​labor​ ​required​ ​for​ ​self-care​ ​and​ ​the​ ​type​ ​of​ ​care​ ​I​ ​am 
advocating​ ​for,​ ​namely​ ​attention​ ​to​ ​basic​ ​needs,​ ​is​ ​something ​ ​that​ ​many​ ​women​ ​of​ ​color 
perform​ ​as​ ​their​ ​daily​ ​jobs.​ ​My ​ ​reliance​ ​on​ ​this​ ​labor​ ​force​ ​is​ ​most​ ​certainly ​ ​an​ ​example​ ​of​ ​me 
“fitting”​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​“misfitting”​ ​into​ ​the​ ​dominant​ ​structures​ ​of​ ​society.​ ​The​ ​basic​ ​care 
requirements​ ​fall​ ​on​ ​the​ ​backs​ ​of​ ​women​ ​of​ ​color,​ ​indicating​ ​that​ ​the​ ​care​ ​is​ ​gendered​ ​and 
racialized.​ ​The ​ ​material ​ ​constraints​ ​of​ ​this​ ​situation​ ​do​ ​not​ ​allow​ ​for​ ​many​ ​women​ ​of​ ​color​ ​to 
address​ ​their​ ​own​ ​care​ ​needs​ ​when​ ​they​ ​are​ ​experiencing​ ​mental​ ​distress,​ ​for​ ​example.​ ​This 
affects​ ​not​ ​just​ ​women​ ​of​ ​color​ ​in​ ​the​ ​global​ ​north,​ ​but​ ​also​ ​those​ ​migrating​ ​from​ ​the​ ​global 
South​ ​to ​ ​the​ ​global​ ​North,​ ​in ​ ​many ​ ​cases​ ​to​ ​perform​ ​underpaid​ ​and ​ ​feminized​ ​care​ ​work. 
Many​ ​scholars​ ​have​ ​addressed ​ ​the​ ​increasing​ ​transnational​ ​migration​ ​of​ ​a​ ​feminized​ ​labor 
force​ ​from ​ ​the ​ ​global​ ​South​ ​to​ ​the​ ​global​ ​North​ ​as​ ​a​ ​result​ ​of​ ​globalization​ ​and​ ​the 
international​ ​reach​ ​of​ ​a​ ​capitalist​ ​market​ ​system​ ​(Barker​ ​&​ ​Feiner,​ ​2010;​ ​Petrozziello,​ ​2011; 
Yeoh,​ ​Huang,​ ​&​ ​Willis,​ ​2000).​ ​A​ ​transformative​ ​politics​ ​of​ ​care​ ​that​ ​addresses​ ​the​ ​basic​ ​needs 
of​ ​women​ ​of​ ​color,​ ​who,​ ​based​ ​on​ ​our​ ​current​ ​framework​ ​of​ ​capitalist​ ​production​ ​are 
relegated​ ​to​ ​attending​ ​to​ ​the​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​others,​ ​is ​ ​necessary​ ​if​ ​we​ ​are​ ​to​ ​continue​ ​to​ ​promote 
self-determination ​ ​as​ ​a​ ​pathway​ ​to​ ​recovery ​ ​from​ ​mental​ ​distress. 
Conclusion 
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increasingly​ ​extensive​ ​literature.​ ​However,​ ​the​ ​specific​ ​care​ ​needs ​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with​ ​psychiatric 
disabilities​ ​present​ ​a​ ​different​ ​dilemma​ ​in​ ​regard​ ​to​ ​care​ ​that​ ​is​ ​not​ ​always​ ​acknowledged​ ​in 
care​ ​literature.​ ​Much​ ​like​ ​episodic​ ​physical​ ​disabilities,​ ​care​ ​needs​ ​for​ ​persons​ ​with 
psychiatric​ ​disabilities​ ​are​ ​not​ ​constant​ ​or​ ​predictable.​ ​As​ ​opposed​ ​to​ ​many​ ​episodic​ ​physical 
disabilities, ​ ​however,​ ​where​ ​the​ ​need​ ​for​ ​care​ ​is ​ ​acknowledged,​ ​people​ ​with​ ​psychiatric 
disabilities​ ​are​ ​expected,​ ​through​ ​self-determination,​ ​to​ ​attend​ ​to​ ​their​ ​own​ ​care​ ​needs.​ ​I 
function​ ​quite​ ​well ​ ​as​ ​a​ ​person ​ ​living ​ ​with​ ​a​ ​psychiatric​ ​disability​ ​a​ ​lot​ ​of​ ​the​ ​time,​ ​but​ ​there 
are​ ​certainly​ ​times​ ​when​ ​I​ ​require​ ​more​ ​support​ ​in​ ​getting​ ​my​ ​basic​ ​needs​ ​met.​ ​I​ ​have​ ​argued 
in​ ​this​ ​paper​ ​that​ ​self-determination​ ​as​ ​a​ ​necessary​ ​path​ ​to​ ​recovery​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​placed​ ​in​ ​the 
broader​ ​material ​ ​context​ ​of​ ​capitalist​ ​production​ ​that​ ​continues​ ​to​ ​marginalize​ ​certain 
populations​ ​based​ ​on​ ​their​ ​gender,​ ​race​ ​and​ ​class​ ​status.​ ​A​ ​feminist​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​care​ ​is​ ​a​ ​useful 
step​ ​forward​ ​as​ ​it ​ ​acknowledges​ ​relationality​ ​and ​ ​connectedness,​ ​rather​ ​than​ ​privileging 
autonomy​ ​and​ ​independence​ ​through​ ​self-determination ​ ​frameworks.​ ​However,​ ​as​ ​Erevelles 
argues,​ ​care​ ​needs,​ ​including ​ ​the​ ​needs​ ​of​ ​people​ ​with ​ ​psychiatric​ ​disabilities,​ ​must​ ​be​ ​placed 
in​ ​the​ ​materialist​ ​context​ ​of​ ​current​ ​societal​ ​structures,​ ​structures ​ ​that​ ​are​ ​upheld​ ​by​ ​notions​ ​of 
autonomy​ ​and​ ​independence.​ ​The​ ​way​ ​our​ ​society​ ​is​ ​currently​ ​structured​ ​allows​ ​only​ ​the 
privileged​ ​to​ ​embrace​ ​self-determination​ ​as​ ​a​ ​necessary​ ​path ​ ​to​ ​recovery.​ ​Placed​ ​within​ ​the 
broader​ ​context​ ​of​ ​transnational ​ ​capitalism,​ ​a​ ​system​ ​that​ ​creates​ ​and​ ​sustains​ ​social 
difference,​ ​it ​ ​becomes​ ​apparent​ ​that​ ​self-determination​ ​is​ ​not​ ​an​ ​option​ ​for​ ​everyone​ ​in​ ​our 
society ​ ​who​ ​is​ ​managing​ ​mental​ ​distress.​ ​The​ ​complexity​ ​of​ ​material​ ​constraints​ ​need​ ​to ​ ​be 
acknowledged ​ ​and​ ​addressed,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​basic​ ​gendered​ ​and ​ ​racialized​ ​labor​ ​of​ ​cooking, 
cleaning,​ ​raising​ ​children​ ​and​ ​securing​ ​stable​ ​housing,​ ​needs​ ​to​ ​be​ ​attended​ ​to​ ​and 
acknowledged ​ ​while​ ​we​ ​advocate​ ​for​ ​self-determination​ ​as ​ ​a​ ​viable​ ​path​ ​to​ ​recovery​ ​for 
everyone. 
Meghann ​ ​O’Leary​​ ​is​ ​a​ ​PhD​ ​candidate​ ​in​ ​Disability​ ​Studies ​ ​at​ ​the​ ​University​ ​of​ ​Illinois​ ​in 
Chicago.​ ​She​ ​holds​ ​a​ ​Master’s​ ​Degree​ ​in​ ​Special​ ​Education​ ​from​ ​the​ ​University​ ​of​ ​New 
Mexico​ ​and​ ​a​ ​Bachelor’s​ ​Degree​ ​in​ ​English​ ​Literature​ ​from​ ​Vassar​ ​College.​ ​Her​ ​research 
interests​ ​include​ ​the​ ​intersections​ ​of​ ​Mad​ ​Studies ​ ​and​ ​Disability​ ​Studies​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as​ ​providing 
an ​ ​intersectional​ ​lens​ ​to​ ​the​ ​study​ ​of​ ​life​ ​writings​ ​by​ ​women​ ​diagnosed​ ​with​ ​psychiatric 
disabilities. ​ ​Her​ ​current ​ ​work​ ​involves​ ​placing​ ​life​ ​writings ​ ​by​ ​women​ ​with ​ ​psychiatric 
disabilities​ ​in​ ​a​ ​historical,​ ​cultural​ ​and ​ ​political​ ​context​ ​to​ ​frame​ ​the​ ​relationship​ ​between 




 REVIEW​ ​OF​ ​DISABILITY​ ​STUDIES:​ ​AN​ ​INTERNATIONAL​ ​JOURNAL Volume​ ​13 ​ ​Issue​ ​4 
 
References 
About.​ ​(n.d.).​ ​​ ​Retrieved​ ​from​​ ​​https://recoveryinthebin.org​. 
Barker,​ ​D.​ ​K.,​ ​&​ ​Feiner,​ ​S.​ ​F.​ ​(2010).​ ​As​ ​the​ ​world​ ​turns:​ ​Globalization,​ ​consumption,​ ​and​ ​the 
feminization​ ​of​ ​work.​ ​​Rethinking​ ​Marxism,​ ​22​(2),​ ​246-252. 
Beresford,​ ​P.​ ​(2016).​ ​The​ ​role​ ​of​ ​survivor​ ​knowledge​ ​in​ ​creating​ ​alternatives​ ​to​ ​psychiatry.​ ​In 
J.Russo​ ​and​ ​A.​ ​Sweeney​ ​(Ed.),​ ​​Searching​ ​for​ ​a ​ ​Rose​ ​Garden:​ ​Challenging​ ​Psychiatry, 
Fostering​ ​Mad​ ​Studies​​ ​(pp.​ ​25-34).​ ​Monmouth,​ ​Wales:​ ​PCCS​ ​Books​ ​Ltd. 
Clement,​ ​G.​ ​(1996).​ ​​Care,​ ​autonomy​ ​and​ ​justice:​ ​Feminism ​ ​and​ ​the​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​care​.​ ​Boulder, 
CO:​ ​Westview​ ​Press. 
Corrigan, ​ ​P.​ ​W.,​ ​Angell,​ ​B.,​ ​Davidson,​ ​L.,​ ​Marcus,​ ​S.​ ​C.,​ ​Salzer,​ ​M.​ ​S.,​ ​Kottsieper,​ ​P.,​ ​Larson, 
J.,​ ​Mahoney,​ ​C.​ ​A.,​ ​O'Connell,​ ​M.​ ​J.,​ ​&​ ​Stanhope,​ ​V.​ ​(2012).​ ​From​ ​adherence​ ​to 
self-determination:​ ​Evolution​ ​of​ ​a​ ​treatment​ ​paradigm​ ​for​ ​people​ ​with​ ​serious​ ​mental 
illness.​ ​​Psychiatric​ ​Services,​ ​63 ​(2),​ ​169-173. 
Davidson,​ ​L.​ ​(2016).​ ​The​ ​recovery​ ​movement:​ ​Implications​ ​for​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​care​ ​and 
enabling​ ​people​ ​to​ ​participate​ ​fully​ ​in​ ​life.​ ​​Health​ ​Affairs:​ ​At​ ​the​ ​Intersection​ ​of​ ​Health, 
Health​ ​Care​ ​and​ ​Policy,​ ​35​(6),​ ​1091-1097. 
Duffy,​ ​M.​ ​(2005).​ ​Reproducing​ ​labor​ ​inequalities:​ ​Challenges ​ ​for​ ​feminists​ ​conceptualizing 
care​ ​at​ ​the​ ​intersections​ ​of​ ​gender,​ ​race​ ​and​ ​class.​ ​​Gender​ ​and​ ​Society,​ ​19​(1),​ ​66-82. 
Duffy,​ ​M.​ ​(2007).​ ​Doing​ ​the ​ ​dirty​ ​work:​ ​Gender,​ ​race​ ​and​ ​reproductive​ ​labor​ ​in​ ​historical 
perspective.​ ​​Gender​ ​and​ ​Society,​ ​21​(3),​ ​313-336. 
Erevelles,​ ​N.​ ​(2011a).​ ​Disability​ ​as​ ​‘becoming’:​ ​Notes​ ​on​ ​the​ ​political​ ​economy​ ​of​ ​the​ ​flesh. 
Disability​ ​and​ ​Difference​ ​in​ ​Global​ ​Contexts:​ ​Enabling​ ​a ​ ​Transformative​ ​Body​ ​Politic 
(pp.​ ​25-63).​ ​New​ ​York,​ ​NY:​ ​Palgrave​ ​MacMillan, 
Erevelles,​ ​N.​ ​(2011b).​ ​(Im)​ ​material ​ ​citizens:​ ​Cognitive​ ​disability,​ ​race,​ ​and​ ​the​ ​politics ​ ​of 
citizenship.​ ​​Disability​ ​and​ ​Difference​ ​in​ ​Global​ ​Contexts:​ ​Enabling​ ​a​ ​Transformative 
Body​ ​Politic​ ​​(pp.​ ​25-63).​ ​New​ ​York,​ ​NY:​ ​Palgrave​ ​MacMillan. 
Erevelles,​ ​N.​ ​(2011c).​ ​The​ ​"other"​ ​side​ ​of​ ​the​ ​dialectic:​ ​Toward​ ​a​ ​materialist​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​care 
Disability​ ​and​ ​Difference​ ​in​ ​Global​ ​Contexts:​ ​Enabling​ ​a ​ ​Transformative​ ​Body​ ​Politic 
(pp.​ ​173-197).​ ​New​ ​York, ​ ​NY: ​ ​Palgrave​ ​Macmillan. 





 REVIEW​ ​OF​ ​DISABILITY​ ​STUDIES:​ ​AN​ ​INTERNATIONAL​ ​JOURNAL Volume​ ​13 ​ ​Issue​ ​4 
 
Gerlach,​ ​J.​ ​(2013).​ ​Jerk:​ ​A​ ​tic-inspired​ ​view ​ ​of​ ​the​ ​self-determination​ ​paradox​ ​in​ ​our​ ​mental 
health​ ​system.​ ​​Journal​ ​of ​ ​Progressive​ ​Human​ ​Services,​ ​24​(3),​ ​200-208. 
Gilligan,​ ​C. ​ ​(1989).​ ​Mapping​ ​the​ ​moral​ ​domain:​ ​New ​ ​images​ ​of​ ​self​ ​in​ ​relationship.​ ​​Cross 
Currents, ​ ​39​(1),​ ​50-63. 
Glenn, ​ ​E. ​ ​N.​ ​(1992).​ ​From​ ​servitude​ ​to​ ​service​ ​work:​ ​Historical​ ​continuities​ ​in​ ​the​ ​racial 
division​ ​of​ ​paid​ ​reproductive​ ​labor.​ ​​Signs:​ ​Journal​ ​of​ ​Women ​ ​in​ ​Culture​ ​and​ ​Society, 
18​(1),​ ​1-43. 
Hughes,​ ​B.,​ ​McKie,​ ​L.,​ ​Hopkins, ​ ​D.,​ ​&​ ​Watson,​ ​N.​ ​(2005).​ ​Love’s​ ​labours ​ ​lost:​ ​Feminism, 
the​ ​disabled ​ ​people’s​ ​movement ​ ​and​ ​an​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​care.​ ​​Sociology,​ ​39​(2),​ ​259-275. 
Kelly,​ ​C.​ ​(2013).​ ​Building​ ​bridges​ ​with​ ​accessible​ ​care:​ ​disability​ ​studies,​ ​feminist​ ​care 
scholarship​ ​and​ ​beyond.​ ​​Hypatia,​ ​28 ​(4),​ ​784-800. 
Kelly,​ ​C.​ ​(2016).​ ​​Disability​ ​politics​ ​and​ ​care:​ ​The​ ​challenge​ ​of​ ​direct​ ​funding.​​ ​Vancouver, 
BC:​ ​UBC​ ​Press. 
Kittay,​ ​E.​ ​(2011).​ ​The​ ​ethics​ ​of​ ​care,​ ​dependence​ ​and​ ​disability.​ ​​An​ ​International​ ​Journal​ ​of 
Jurisprudence​ ​and​ ​Philosophy​ ​of​ ​Law,​ ​24​(1),​ ​49-58. 
Larner,​ ​W.​ ​(2000). ​ ​Neoliberalism: ​ ​Policy,​ ​ideology​ ​and​ ​governmentality.​ ​​Studies ​ ​in​ ​Political 
Economy,​ ​63 ​(1),​ ​5-25. 
Larrabee,​ ​M.​ ​J.​ ​(1993).​ ​Introduction​.​​ ​In​ ​M.​ ​J.​ ​Larrabee​ ​(Ed.),​ ​​An​ ​ethic​ ​of​ ​care:​ ​Feminist​ ​and 
interdisciplinary​ ​perspectives​ ​​(pp.​ ​310).​ ​New ​ ​York,​ ​NY:​ ​Routledge. 
Mancini,​ ​A.​ ​D.​ ​(2008).​ ​Self-determination​ ​theory:​ ​A ​ ​framework ​ ​for​ ​the​ ​recovery​ ​paradigm. 
Advances​ ​in​ ​Psychiatric​ ​Treatment,​ ​14​(5),​ ​358-365. 
O’Leary,​ ​M.​ ​&​ ​Ben-Moshe, ​ ​L.​ ​(Forthcoming).​ ​Homage​ ​to​ ​Spencer:​ ​The​ ​politics​ ​of 
“treatment”​ ​and​ ​“choice”​ ​in​ ​neoliberal​ ​time​s.​​ ​In​ ​L.​ ​Costa,​ ​P.​ ​Beresford​ ​and​ ​A.​ ​Daley 
(Ed.),​ ​​Madness,​ ​Violence​ ​and​ ​Power:​ ​A​ ​Radical​ ​Anthology. 
Petrozziello,​ ​A.​ ​J.​ ​(2011).​ ​Feminised ​ ​financial​ ​flows:​ ​how​ ​gender​ ​affects​ ​remittances ​ ​in 
Honduran–US​ ​transnational ​ ​families.​ ​​Gender​ ​&​ ​Development,​ ​19​(1),​ ​53-67. 
Piltch,​ ​C.​ ​A.​ ​(2016).​ ​Speaking ​ ​out: ​ ​The​ ​role​ ​of​ ​self-determination​ ​in​ ​mental​ ​health​ ​recovery. 
Psychiatric​ ​Rehabilitation ​ ​Journal,​ ​39​(1),​ ​77-80. 





 REVIEW​ ​OF​ ​DISABILITY​ ​STUDIES:​ ​AN​ ​INTERNATIONAL​ ​JOURNAL Volume​ ​13 ​ ​Issue​ ​4 
 
Rodríguez,​ ​D.​ ​(2012)​ ​Racial/colonial​ ​genocide​ ​and ​ ​the​ ​“neoliberal​ ​academy:”​ ​in​ ​excess​ ​of​ ​a 
problematic.​ ​​American​ ​Quarterly,​ ​64​(4),​ ​809-813. 
Ryan,​ ​R.​ ​M.,​ ​&​ ​Deci,​ ​E.​ ​L.​ ​(2000).​ ​Self-determination​ ​theory​ ​and​ ​the​ ​facilitation​ ​of​ ​intrinsic 
motivation,​ ​social ​ ​development,​ ​and​ ​well-being.​ ​​American​ ​Psychologist,​ ​55​(1),​ ​68​ ​–78. 
Safran,​ ​M.​ ​A.,​ ​Mays​ ​Jr,​ ​R.​ ​A.,​ ​Huang,​ ​L.​ ​N.,​ ​McCuan,​ ​R.,​ ​Pham,​ ​P.​ ​K.,​ ​Fisher,​ ​S.​ ​K.,​ ​...​ ​& 
Trachtenberg,​ ​A.​ ​(2009).​ ​Mental​ ​health​ ​disparities.​ ​​American​ ​Journal​ ​of​ ​Public​ ​Health, 
99​(11),​ ​1962-1966. 
Shakespeare,​ ​T. ​ ​(2000).​ ​T ​he​ ​social​ ​relations​ ​of​ ​care.​ ​In​ ​S.​ ​G.​ ​Gail​ ​Lewis,​ ​John​ ​Clarke​ ​(Ed.), 
Rethinking​ ​Social​ ​Policy.​​ ​London:​ ​SAGE​ ​Publications. 
Watson,​ ​N.,​ ​Mckie,​ ​L.,​ ​Hughes,​ ​B.,​ ​Hopkins,​ ​D.,​ ​&​ ​Gregory,​ ​S.​ ​(2004).​ ​(Inter)​ ​dependence 
needs​ ​and​ ​care: ​ ​The​ ​potential​ ​for​ ​disability​ ​and​ ​feminist​ ​theorists​ ​to​ ​develop​ ​an 
emancipatory ​ ​model.​ ​​Sociology,​ ​38​(2),​ ​331-350. 
Yeoh,​ ​B.,​ ​Huang,​ ​S.,​ ​&​ ​Willis,​ ​K.​ ​(2000).​ ​Global​ ​cities,​ ​transnational​ ​flows​ ​and​ ​gender 
dimensions: ​ ​the​ ​view​ ​from​ ​Singapore.​ ​​Tijdschrift​ ​voor​ ​economische​ ​en​ ​sociale 
geografie,​ ​91​(2),​ ​147-158. 
 
 
 
Page​ ​20 
 
